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FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT
ANDREW K. JENNINGS†
ABSTRACT
Firms sometimes break the law. When they do, a host of government
agencies have power to bring enforcement actions against them, which
serve to punish past wrongs, compensate victims, disgorge unlawful
gains, deter others, and prevent recidivism. Each of these purposes but
one—preventing recidivism—is either met or not once the case reaches
settlement. Whether recidivism will occur, however, remains uncertain
at the time a case is settled. In light of that uncertainty, this Article takes
a critical look at how enforcers currently address recidivism
prevention—what it dubs the “clawback” approach—under which
defendant firms receive penalty credit today in exchange for remedial
efforts that, it is hoped, will prevent recidivism tomorrow. This Article
examines the incentives and constraints of the two parties—the enforcer
and the firm—and concludes that an alternative “follow-up” approach
that credits only firms’ demonstrated results would be more effective
and efficient at recidivism prevention.
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INTRODUCTION
Firms sometimes break the law.1 When they do, a host of
government agencies2 have power to bring enforcement actions against
them, which serve to punish past wrongs, compensate victims, disgorge

1. The relative merits, and appropriate roles, for civil and criminal enforcement against
corporations is well covered in the literature. See generally, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (proposing
alternative rules to strict vicarious criminal liability so as to mitigate potentially perverse effects
of corporate criminal liability); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn, No Body To Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981)
(proposing three approaches to corporate punishment); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes,
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (concluding that corporate criminal liability
produces overdeterrence); Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61
STAN. L. REV. 271 (2008) (calling for greater reliance on purely financial corporate penalties);
Wilson Meeks, Note, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and
Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77
(2006) (proposing that enforcement against corporate wrongdoing should be entirely civil). This
Article, however, mostly does not differentiate between civil and criminal violations. The
distinctions may matter, though, as the problems discussed throughout this Article most likely
manifest when the enforcer is a generalist agency (a criminal prosecutor, say) versus when it is an
expert regulator (an environmental-protection or banking agency, perhaps).
2. These agencies include criminal prosecutors (the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
and state attorneys general), multi-industry regulators (the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and state workplace-safety commissions), and single-industry regulators
(the Federal Reserve and state insurance commissioners). This Article looks mostly to the DOJ
and SEC as stand-ins for their sister enforcers.
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unlawful gains, deter others, and prevent recidivism.3 Each of these
purposes but one—preventing recidivism—is either met or not once
the case reaches settlement.4 Whether recidivism will occur, however,
remains uncertain at the time a case is settled.5 In light of that
uncertainty, this Article takes a critical look at how enforcers currently
address recidivism prevention—what it dubs the “clawback”
approach—under which defendant firms receive reduced penalties
today in exchange for remedial efforts that, it is hoped, will prevent
recidivism tomorrow.6 This Article examines the incentives and

3. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 9-28.200(B) (2020) [hereinafter DOJ Manual],
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations
[https://perma.cc/K2ZM-YMU5] (instructing federal prosecutors to pursue the “general purposes
of the criminal law” in enforcing against corporations, including “appropriate punishment for the
defendant, deterrence of further criminal conduct by the defendant, deterrence of criminal
conduct by others, protection of the public from dangerous and fraudulent conduct,
rehabilitation, and restitution for victims”).
4. For example, an enforcer might impose a penalty for past wrongdoing and require
restitution to victims and disgorgement of illegal profits. By publicly announcing this sanction, it
signals to other firms that violations will be punished and result in a financial loss, thereby
deterring them from breaking the law. Some of these purposes can be fully achieved. For example,
a victim who was defrauded of an exact sum may be made whole if a solvent firm is ordered to
repay the money with interest. Deterrence, on the other hand, is generally incomplete: it is
doubtful any enforcement action will persuade all firms against committing violations. Whether
an enforcement action does deter future violations, either on its own or in aggregate with other
actions, will vary. But by announcing an enforcement action and its sanctions, the enforcer will
have used it for what it can contribute toward that purpose. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Enforcement Manual § 6.3 (2017) [hereinafter SEC Manual], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYK9-BRMU] (directing SEC enforcement
staff to include language in settlements touting the benefits of cooperation and to include similar
language in press releases).
5. For simplicity, this Article uses the term “settlement” to refer to any negotiated
resolution of an enforcement action. These resolutions result from an agreement between a
corporate defendant and an enforcement agency. They sometimes require judicial approval, such
as in criminal proceedings or civil cases filed in court (as opposed to those brought
administratively). See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3) (providing for judicial approval or
disapproval of plea agreements); SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
that courts must satisfy themselves that proposed consent decrees are in the public interest).
Enforcement settlements may be embodied in settlement and plea agreements, consent decrees,
deferred- and nonprosecution agreements (“DPAs” and “NPAs”), corporate-integrity
agreements, or documents with other titles. For examples of those documents, see infra notes 9
(nonprosecution agreement), 28 (settlement and corporate-integrity agreements), and 88
(deferred-prosecution agreement).
6. Since the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,
the term “clawback” has been commonly used in the executive-compensation context. See, e.g.,
infra notes 33 and 50. This Article, however, refers to its broader meaning of giving a benefit and
then forcefully taking it back. See Clawback, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining “clawback” as “[a] statutory or contractual provision that for specified reasons reverses
a distribution or payment,” a definition added in 1965); Clawback, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS
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constraints of the two parties—the enforcer and the firm—and
concludes that an alternative “follow-up” approach rewarding only
firms’ demonstrated results would be more effective and efficient at
recidivism prevention.
Current practice rewards defendants with lighter sanctions in
exchange for undertaking remedial efforts.7 These efforts, in turn, are
expected to address the root causes of corporate wrongdoing and thus
prevent recidivism.8 For example, a firm that has been caught paying
bribes to foreign customs officers might identify inadequate employee
training as a root cause for that misconduct.9 As remediation, it would
institute new anticorruption training.10 The firm might also update its
accounting systems to make it harder to get money for bribes or to hide
illicit payments.11 Because these efforts are the types of steps that the
enforcer believes will reduce the likelihood of future violations, the
enforcer will allow the firm to pay a lighter penalty than if there had

ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011) (defining “clawback” as “a situation in which a government or
company takes back money that it has already paid”). This Article focuses on enforcer-driven
recidivism prevention. It is not the only option for government-based response to corporate
recidivism. Federal courts sentencing corporate defendants, for example, may order remedial
undertakings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(c)(1) (2018) (authorizing probation as a sentence for an
organization). Compared to sentencing courts, however, enforcers have less affirmative authority
to require remediation absent the firm’s agreement. But cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2018) (permitting
bank supervisors to order that banks cease and desist unsafe and unsound practices).
7. Common remedial efforts include disciplining employees who engage in misconduct and
introducing new compliance training, internal controls, due diligence, ethics policies, and
monitoring tools. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L.: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
ENFORCEMENT §§ 5.07–5.17 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019) (listing topics on
“compliance risk assessment” and “employees, agents, and counterparties”).
8. See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS 17 (2020) [hereinafter EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS],
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/YMH4-XHX5]
(“[A] hallmark of a compliance program that is working effectively in practice is the extent to which
a company is able to conduct a thoughtful root cause analysis of misconduct and timely and
appropriately remediate to address the root causes.”).
9. See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the SEC and the Ralph Lauren Corp., U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, at Ex. A ¶ 12 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-65npa.pdf [https://perma.cc/52CT-JTHX] (reciting Ralph Lauren’s remedial efforts in connection with
a foreign-bribery investigation as “adoption of: (1) an amended anticorruption policy and translation
of the policy into eight languages, (2) enhanced due diligence procedures for third parties, (3) an
enhanced commissions policy, (4) an amended gift policy, and (5) in-person anticorruption training
for certain employees”).
10. Id.
11. See Stryker Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 70,751, 2013 WL 5757376, at *6 (Oct. 24,
2013) (Cease-and-Desist Order) (recognizing Stryker Corporation’s new anticorruption training
and “enhanced financial controls and governance” as among its remedial efforts in a foreignbribery case).
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been no remediation at all.12 This credit is not binary, however. The
more substantial the remediation—the more the defendant does to
reduce the risk of recidivism—the greater the credit.13 Remediation,
then, is something that the public will pay for, in the form of forgone
penalty revenue, because it wants to reduce future violations of the law,
and it is something that a defendant does to reduce its penalty for past
wrongdoing.14
This approach has pragmatic appeal: trade a corporate sanction
for corporate reform. But three interrelated problems frustrate its
aims.
First, by giving up-front credit for remediation, enforcers risk
paying for recidivism prevention—by imposing lighter sanctions—
without achieving a proportionate reduction in future violations.15 The
firm, for its part, locks in a deal at settlement. Regardless whether the
remedial efforts it undertakes work (specifically, whether it avoids
recidivating), the company receives the full benefit.16 It receives credit,

12. See CRIM. DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 60 (2d ed.
2012) (“Compliance policies cannot work unless effectively communicated throughout a
company. Accordingly, DOJ and SEC will evaluate whether a company has taken steps to ensure
that relevant policies and procedures have been communicated throughout the organization,
including through periodic training and certification for all directors, officers, [and] relevant
employees . . . .” (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7UC9-LCPD])).
13. Eugene Soltes, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs:
Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms, 14 NYU J.L. & BUS. 965, 1000 (2018)
(noting that “[c]ompliance effectiveness is not a binary condition” and that the “federal
sentencing guidelines recognize that even effective programs can fail”).
14. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 703 (2009) (“While many corporations surely enter into
monitorships with a sincere desire to fix problems and regain their ethical footing, their immediate
goal is to mitigate: to resolve the matter without a criminal indictment and at the least possible
cost.”); cf. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1431 (2009) (recognizing the risk that “civil enforcement will be viewed
as only a price to be paid”).
15. Because it represents forgone public revenue, a discount on a sanction is equivalent to
the public paying defendants for remediation, which might or might not be adequately rendered.
Economist Gary Becker observes that “[n]ot only do [nonmonetary] punishments fail to
compensate, but they also require ‘victims’ to spend additional resources in carrying out the
punishment.” Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 194 (1968). Sometimes, it turns out, monetary punishments do too.
16. A remark in an interview by Professors Cristie Ford and David Hess captures the
problem at this Article’s heart: “Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn’t, maybe nobody knows,
because there’s nobody out there evaluating these things. And unless a company gets caught
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then, not for preventing recidivism but for efforts that the enforcer
believes will reduce the risk of recidivism.17
Under standard terms of corporate settlements, recidivists could
face a clawback of settlement benefits given for prior misconduct.18
And they always face the threat of new enforcement actions for
recidivist violations.19 Those threats could theoretically motivate firms
to ensure that their remedial efforts work so that they do not suffer
consequences from clawbacks or new enforcement for fresh violations.
But these postsettlement monitoring and accountability approaches do
not adequately address the misalignment between when firms are paid
for recidivism prevention (now) and when they must perform (later).
Postsettlement monitoring will often fail to detect new violations, and
enforcers will generally prioritize working new cases over policing old
settlements.20
Beyond the difficulty of detecting recidivism and an enforcer’s
preference for new cases, clawing back settlement benefits or bringing
doing something improper again nobody may find out whether the deferred prosecution
agreement worked or didn’t work.” Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 725.
17. This practice yields uncertain compliance effects because, as Professor Kimberly
Krawiec explains, “the indicia of an effective compliance system are easily mimicked and true
effectiveness is difficult for courts and regulators to determine.” Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 487, 491–92 (2003); see
also Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 936–37 (2017)
(“We are far enough along in the law of compliance that all major firms do something in the name
of compliance, often with checklists at hand of ‘to do’ items. Successful firms are usually adept at
impression management, and managers and employees often believe their own myths.” (footnote
omitted)).
18. For example, if a firm that received a nonprosecution agreement breached the
agreement, it would be exposed to charges for the conduct underlying the agreement as well as to
potential prosecution for conduct leading to the breach. See, e.g., Letter from Sandra Moser,
Acting Chief, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to F. Joseph Warin, Counsel for Petróleo Brasileiro
S.A. – Petrobras (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1096706/
download [https://perma.cc/JZR4-JFUM] (designating the commission of a U.S. federal felony or
the failure to implement a specified compliance program as material breaches).
19. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS 166 (2014) (concluding after a review of corporate-enforcement cases that
“[i]t is not at all clear that prosecutors take corporate recidivism seriously”). The advocacy group
Public Citizen conducted an analysis of corporate criminal-enforcement data from the Duke
University/University of Virginia School of Law Corporate Prosecution Registry. RICK
CLAYPOOL, PUB. CITIZEN, SOFT ON CORPORATE CRIME 2 (Alan Zibel & Robert Weissman eds.,
2019). The analysis found that of the companies that entered into a DPA or NPA with the DOJ,
thirty-eight faced a subsequent criminal enforcement action. Id. at 5. Seven of those companies
faced consequences for breaching their DPA/NPA (extensions of the supervision period,
payment of a financial penalty, or both). Id. at 5, 33–34. And DPA and NPAs with recidivists
accounted for 15 percent of the 535 such agreements entered into by the DOJ since 1992. Id. at 5.
20. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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a new action runs into constraints on enforcer behavior. These
constraints include contractual and due process limits on clawbacks
and the need to allocate finite enforcement resources between cases.
To claw back benefits, enforcers face real hurdles. They will typically
need to complete an internal agency approval process to proceed.21
Their discretion to act is further constrained by due process obligations
and general contract principles.22 More, settlements generally do not
allow for incremental clawbacks. The most significant benefit in most
corporate settlements is some form of nonprosecution or lesser
charges.23 The clawback authority afforded by many settlements is to
revoke that benefit and proceed to litigation,24 a severe remedy not
usually imposed absent egregious recidivist violations. Enforcers will
be reluctant to revoke settlement benefits in part because doing so
could impose collateral consequences on constituencies they deem to
be “innocent,” including employees, shareholders, and commercial
counterparties.25 Indeed, avoiding those collateral consequences is
often one of the enforcer’s own motivations for settling with an
offender firm. And although extending an agreement’s monitoring
term due to continued compliance failures offers an intermediate

21. See SEC Manual, supra note 4, §§ 6.2.2–6.2.3 (noting that SEC staff must obtain
commission approval before bringing an enforcement action against firms for breach of
nonprosecution and deferred-prosecution agreements).
22. See United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Due process concerns
preclude the government from unilaterally nullifying [nonprosecution] agreements where, as
here, the government believes the defendant is in breach.”); United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A.,
524 F. Supp. 2d 586, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Non-prosecution agreements, like any contract, require
that each party fulfill its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance.”).
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
24. But compare supra note 18 (describing the severe consequence for breach as the loss of
the nonprosecution benefit), with infra note 190 (describing relatively modest daily financial
penalties for noncompliance).
25. See supra note 19 (discussing the relative lack of consequences for firms that breach their
settlement agreements). Although settlement agreements typically commit broad discretion to
enforcers in making clawback decisions, that discretion is constrained by the government’s due
process obligations, as well as by a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. See supra note
22 and accompanying text (discussing due process and contractual constraints on clawbacks).
Enforcers do have the ability to express displeasure with a firm’s performance under a settlement
agreement and to demand that it address those concerns. Because those inquiries impose
investigative costs on firms in the form of legal fees, executive time and angst, and the like, they
would be akin to corporate process-as-punishment. Cf. MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 31 (1979) (“[P]retrial costs
do not distinguish between innocent and guilty; they are borne by all, by those whose casses are
nolled or dismissed as well as by those who are pronounced guilty.”).
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consequence between doing nothing and revoking the agreement, that
step ultimately defers the hard decision.26
Combined, enforcers’ motivations and constraints mean that the
threats of clawback and new actions have limited credibility.27 There is
thus the risk that after making a deal, firms will shirk or fail at reform
and then recidivate without consequence.
Second, the remedial efforts credited under current practice either
are complete by settlement or are to be completed postsettlement.
Because enforcers are weakly motivated to monitor old cases, they
instead exert influence at settlement over how remediation will be
done. They do so because it is their last realistic chance to promote and
influence recidivism prevention at that firm. At settlement, however,
there is considerable uncertainty around what must be done to effect
lasting reform, and in any sufficiently complex reform process,
adjustments will likely be needed along the way. The clawback
approach creates rigidity in corporate behavior that can undermine the
reform process by limiting a firm’s ability to make adjustments.
Because they lose practical leverage over firms after settlement,
enforcers might require substantial remedial efforts that seem
worthwhile but are, in fact, superficial or excessive.
And third, the first two problems are complicated by failures to
establish objective outcomes for reform. Standard settlements require
prospective general adherence to the law and specific adherence to
mechanical terms (for example, hire a chief compliance officer who
reports directly to the audit committee),28 instead of more testable and
meaningful mandates like “within X years, on an annual basis the
defendant will have no instances of violation Y.” When credit is not
26. See, e.g., Jeffrey May, U.S. Moves To Modify, Extend Antitrust Consent Decree with
Live Nation/Ticketmaster, WOLTERS KLUWER (Dec. 19, 2019), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/
news/antitrust-law-daily/u-s-moves-to-modify-extend-antitrust-consent-decree-with-livenation-ticketmaster/101841 [https://perma.cc/G3W9-LP43] (reporting on the DOJ’s desire to
extend a consent decree due to violations of the decree).
27. See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 278 (“DOJ prosecution guidelines do not require followup evaluation, and as a result, neither do most deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements.”).
28. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., CORPORATE
INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
AND PFIZER, INC. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Pfizer CIA], https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/
pfizer_inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/354Q-8G3A]; N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND STATEN ISLAND
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL AND SIUH SYSTEMS, INC. 5 (2005), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
press-releases/archived/SIUH%20SETTLEMENT%20AGREEMENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/
73LK-9KWV].
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conditioned on measurable outcomes but is given up-front, there is
little reason to rigorously test what effect the remedial efforts actually
had.29 Without those results to judge firms’ performance, it cannot be
known whether the public is paying for recidivism prevention or
merely for “cosmetic” reforms.30
This Article proposes modest modifications to settlement practice
to overcome the problems that inhere in the clawback approach. Under
a follow-up approach, at settlement, enforcers and defendants would
agree to reform objectives and set a maximum potential credit against
a baseline penalty for achieving them. Management would itself decide
how to achieve the reform objectives and lead the implementation.
And, at a later agreed-upon point, the parties would assess what credit
the defendant has earned based on whether it has fully or partially met
its reform objectives. Importantly, this assessment would include
actively looking for low-level recidivist violations that go undetected
with today’s passive monitoring style31 but, in aggregate, reflect on the
effectiveness of the firm’s efforts.32
This approach would serve as a commitment mechanism for both
parties. Firms would treat remediation more earnestly if they receive
credit only for results. And enforcers would give greater focus to
29. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER
TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2009) (“DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to
which DPAs and NPAs—in addition to other tools, such as prosecution—contribute to the
department’s efforts to combat corporate crime because it has no measures to assess their
effectiveness.”); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 725. At the close of his article on the use
of corporate criminal prosecution to effect structural reforms, Professor Brandon Garrett
observed that the DOJ did not appear to test whether reform-driven prosecutions “produced or
will produce the sought-after compliance.” Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,
93 VA. L. REV. 852, 934 (2007). Comparing these prosecutions to an earlier generation of civilreform-driven litigation, he expressed hope that best practices would emerge. Id. Since then,
however, it is unclear what progress the government has made on that front. Id.; see also Brandon
L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2020) (“[I]t
is a pervasive problem that we lack metrics to evaluate whether compliance programs—the focus
of so much litigation and regulation—actually reduce underlying violations.”).
30. See Krawiec, supra note 17, at 542.
31. See generally Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive Is Corporate
Fraud? (May 2020) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/
papers/DyckMorseZingalesPervasive.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8L6-P7FB] (using analytical methods
to estimate that only one in three frauds are detected in U.S. public companies and that ongoing
fraud occurs in one out of seven of those firms).
32. Even if data on low-level violations were available in the context of the current clawback
approach, enforcers would still face due process and resource constraints on effecting clawbacks
or bringing new actions, two considerations that would demotivate them from responding to those
violations. See supra notes 18 and 22 and accompanying text.
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recidivism prevention because the settlement structure would force
them to evaluate the results. In other words, this approach would shift
the burden to defendants to earn remediation credit. If they fail, then
at least the public will not have overpaid for recidivism prevention. In
contrast, current practice places the burden on enforcers to detect
recidivism and take affirmative steps to claw back benefits. This shift is
subtle, but important. The threat of not giving benefits tends to be
more credible than the threat of taking them away once given.33
A secondary effect of current practice is that enforcers miss
opportunities to generate new public-good knowledge about what
works for effecting corporate compliance. This lost opportunity means
that firms undertaking remediation cannot build on data from prior
remediations.34 All else equal, losing out on this knowledge may result
in less successful remediations and thus more recidivist violations. It
also means that ex ante compliance programs cannot benefit from this
knowledge and thus will be less successful than they otherwise could
be, contributing indirectly to more violations. But, by structuring
remediation credit around measurable objectives and evaluations of
results against those objectives, the follow-up approach could force the
development of new knowledge that could in turn drive more effective
ex ante compliance and ex post remediation.
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I explains why the
clawback approach is not a credible enforcement mechanism for
settlement agreements and why that lack of credibility can lead to
settlements that are ineffective or inefficient for recidivism prevention.

33. The executive-compensation context suggests how hard clawbacks can be. The Wells
Fargo accounts scandal provides an example. As the scandal gained public and political attention,
the bank announced that its CEO and head of community banking would together forfeit $60
million in unvested stock awards. Renae Merle, Wells Fargo CEO To Forfeit $41 Million in
Performance Pay After Sales Scandal, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://wapo.st/2cTgMfq
[https://perma.cc/9U4J-HT57]. Only after they left the company did its board act to claw back
another $75 million in compensation the pair had already received. Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A.
Kingson, Wells Fargo To Claw Back $75 Million From 2 Former Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2oimaRp [https://perma.cc/B5J3-LEB9]. In another example, in 2019, The
Hertz Corporation sued former senior executives five years after the company announced that it
would be required to restate its financial statements due to accounting errors. Complaint & Jury
Demand at 1, Hertz Corp. v. Frissora, No. 19-CV-08927-ES (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2019). In its
restatement, the company cited “an inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate tone at the top” as
a potential factor in its financial misstatements. The Hertz Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 92
(July 16, 2015).
34. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 736 (observing that “the absence of systematic
methods for capturing the lessons of past monitorships is a major failing” and urging that
enforcers use their leverage to capture data on best practices and indicators of performance).

JENNINGS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/25/2021 8:03 PM

FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT

1579

Part II outlines an alternative: the follow-up approach, which also has
the potential for generating data that can advance compliance practice.
Part III closes with implications for how follow-up enforcement, the
incentives it creates, and the data it produces can contribute to
corporate governance, enforcement, and compliance. This Part also
anticipates firm and enforcer objections and explains how
entrepreneurial enforcement leaders might introduce follow-up
enforcement despite those objections.
I. ENFORCEMENT SETTLEMENTS AND REFORM
During the enforcement process, enforcers and firms have
divergent, but not always inconsistent, interests. In pursuing these
interests, each has something it can trade when the stakes are
sufficiently high. Firms facilitate public-protection functions of
enforcers by self-reporting misconduct and cooperating with
investigations, and, in return, enforcers reduce the sanctions firms face
for past wrongdoing. These trades promise to leave each better off than
if there had been an adversarial resolution. This Part focuses on one
term of enforcement settlements—recidivism prevention or
“reform”—and its potential to yield suboptimal results.35 It examines
enforcer and firm interests as they relate to reform, explains why
misalignment in the timing of settlement process can lead to
suboptimal terms, and identifies risks that misalignment poses to the
prevention of corporate misconduct.
A. Enforcement Actions and Corporate Reform
1. Trading Between Sanction and Reform. Most enforcement
actions involve relatively minor violations.36 They are generally strict

35. This Article defines “recidivism” as a violation that follows an enforcement action and
that shares a common cause, or has a nexus, with a prior violation. For example, a bank whose
brokerage business is caught engaging in market manipulation would be said to recidivate if its
brokers subsequently defraud customers. These violations deal with the same business and thus
they likely stem from common causes, such as inadequate controls, compensation policies that
incent misconduct, or inappropriate management tone. In contrast, if the bank’s consumer-loan
business is subsequently caught violating state fair-lending laws, then that violation would quite
likely have distinct causes from the market manipulation in the brokerage business. The fairlending violations thus might not be “recidivism,” as this Article means it.
36. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 413–14 (2019) (“Although not all agencies release such figures, those that
are available in agency reports reflect the [enforcement] pyramid’s space allocation in that the
quantity of less formal activity is significantly greater than more formal proceedings.”).
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liability offenses that do not on their own create a grave risk to public
welfare (death or serious injury or significant financial loss).37 These
violations result in modest penalties, often capped by statute.38 But
some violations do gravely risk public welfare.39 These violations, to be
proven, typically require enforcers to show some form of scienter on
the part of the firm,40 and they are likely to result from systemic
conditions, such as the tone set by top management.41 For minor
violations, the interests are too small, and the penalties too low, to
justify the transaction costs of a bespoke settlement.42 But in more
serious cases—the subject of this Article—each party has substantial
interests over which the other has some control, leading to negotiated

37. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL 4-21
(2019), https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL_02-00-163.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8CBE-JSD6] (defining “Other-than-Serious” violations as occurring in “situations where
the accident/incident or illness that would be most likely to result from a hazardous condition would
probably not cause death or serious physical harm, but would have a direct and immediate
relationship to the safety and health of employees”).
38. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. 2264, 2972 (Jan. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1903.15(d)(4)) (liming penalties imposed by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration on employers for “other-than-serious” workplace-safety violations to $13,653 per
violation).
39. Cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (2018) (defining a serious
violation of workplace safety as one in which there is “a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists . . . in [a] place of employment
unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the
presence of the violation”).
40. V.S. Khanna, Is The Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate
Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 366–69 (1999) (introducing varied mens rea that apply to
corporate criminal conduct).
41. An example of such improper tone at the top would include a mining company whose
leadership disregards workplace safety—and pushes local managers to do the same—leading to
preventable injuries and deaths. See M INE S AFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’ T OF LABOR ,
REPORT OF I NVESTIGATION : F ATAL U NDERGROUND M INE E XPLOSION 2 (2011), https://
www.msha.gov/sites/default/files/Data_Reports/Fatals/Coal/Upper%20Big%20Branch/
FTL10c0331.pdf [https://perma.cc/R39U-CPVD] (concluding that “the unlawful policies and
practices implemented by PCC/Massey were the root cause” of the 2010 Upper Big Branch mine
disaster in West Virginia that killed twenty-nine coal miners, and further concluding that “PCC/
Massey promoted and enforced a workplace culture that valued production over safety, including
practices calculated to allow it to conduct mining operations in violation of the law”).
42. Professor Michael Klausner theorizes that standardized terms not only save contracting
resources, but they also reduce the risk of error and create network effects among users of the
terms. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 780–83 (1995). Standard enforcement terms would thus be expected to be desirable in
areas of high-volume, but modest-stakes, enforcement, like routine workplace-safety and
environmental cases.

JENNINGS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT

3/25/2021 8:03 PM

1581

settlements.43 This Section reviews those interests as they affect the
remediation provisions of settlement agreements.
Enforcers—as agencies and as individual agents—have public and
reputational interests in settlement.44 Within its resource and expertise
constraints, an enforcer seeks to bring a meaningful number of cases
that fit its public-protection priorities.45 The enforcer also seeks to
maintain its reputation with political institutions, industry, and the
public.46 Individual agents, like line enforcement attorneys, may share
their agencies’ institutional interests. They also have interests in their
own professional reputations and advancement.47
Enforcers prefer finality. Closing a case frees up resources for new
cases.48 And obtaining “good” results—such as impressive penalties
and credible-appearing remedial efforts—satisfies both publicprotection and reputational interests.49 Thus, even if it retains authority
to claw back settlement benefits from a recidivist—possibly through a
deferred- (“DPA”) or nonprosecution agreement (“NPA”)—the
43. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2007) (explaining that “[b]oth the government
and the firm have strong incentives to settle the case”). This Article’s stylized discussion of
negotiations does not imply that enforcers and defendants engage as equals. Indeed, it assumes
that in most cases the enforcer has leverage to more or less impose its desired terms, subject to
marginal concessions in favor of the defendant.
44. See Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 670 (2007) (“The [SEC] is a collection of people, some
interested in any or all of the following: justice; victory; reputation; and political gain.”).
45. See id. at 671 (discussing the SEC’s resource-constraint motivations for settlement);
Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1720–21 (listing the avoidance of the difficulty, complexity,
and expense of corporate cases as incentives for enforcers to settle).
46. See generally ARTHUR LEVITT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET (2002)
(discussing the effects of political pressure on enforcement during Levitt’s tenure as SEC
chairman); Samuel W. Buell, Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime,
96 N.C. L. REV. 823, 840–47 (2018) (theorizing that in announcing corporate criminal actions,
prosecutors seek to garner support from or to satisfy the public, Congress, and industry); Johnson,
supra note 44, at 672–73 (discussing the SEC’s reputational and political interests in settlement,
including avoiding the reputational costs of trial losses and the pressure of “popular sentiment to
act in response to market factors and scandals”).
47. Individual agents might act in view of future rents in private-sector roles. See Buell, supra
note 46, at 838–40 (discussing the careerist motivations prosecutors might have when prosecuting
corporate crimes). Under this account, agents’ earning potential will be affected by the types of
cases they bring and how they manage them. Id.
48. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 729 (“The prosecutor wants to close his file in a way
that is reasonably calculated to ensure that the subject corporation has at least decent, industrystandard compliance processes in place (at least on paper), and then move on to the next case.”).
49. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 259
(Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
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enforcer’s preference for finality keeps it from closely monitoring the
firm after settlement for signs of recidivism.50 The same goes for
bringing new actions for recidivist violations.51 Instead, the enforcer
accepts a substitute. It allows the firm to implement remedial efforts,
or to undertake to do so, in exchange for a lighter penalty.52 Although
these efforts are not the same as an absence of recidivism, they
potentially reduce the risk that the firm reoffends. Accepting this
substitute for postsettlement policing allows the enforcer to advance its
public-protection interest in preventing future violations while
achieving finality.
Mirroring enforcers, firms—as organizations and as personified by
individual managers—have institutional and personal interests. A firm
seeks to emerge from an enforcement action with the lowest possible
sanction, disruption to operations, and damage to reputation.53
Individual managers want to reduce the attention they must give to an
enforcement action and appreciate that an action could affect their
personal compensation or retention,54 as well as their professional

50. The clawback approach discussed in this Article is not, of course, the only use of
clawbacks as a compliance-enforcement mechanism. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires
the SEC to adopt rules (which to date are still forthcoming) mandating clawbacks of excess
incentive-based compensation at public companies that restate their financial results. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-4(b) (2018). Some companies have adopted clawback policies that apply to nonfinancial
misconduct. See Jonathan Ocker, Justin Krawitz & Ben Gibbs, The State of Play on Clawbacks
and Forfeitures Based on Misconduct, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 7, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/07/the-state-of-play-on-clawbacks-and-forfeituresbased-on-misconduct [https://perma.cc/L8K5-XNFE]. And in a recent article, scholars propose a
clawback model for enhancing board governance in the compliance context. See John Armour,
Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 50 (2020).
51. Although enforcers may have facial authority under settlements’ terms to claw back
benefits (for example, by lifting the deferral of a prosecution), this authority is constrained by the
requirement to obtain supervisor approval and to comply with the due process requirements any
government agency is bound by. Those barriers may in reality render clawback authority a paper
tiger. See SEC Manual, supra note 4, § 6.2.2–6.2.3 (reviewing those barriers); supra note 19 (citing
empirical evidence that corporate recidivists do not experience clawbacks).
52. In exchange for remediating, the enforcer gives the firm a discounted penalty, perhaps
(hypothetically) charging it $10 million for past wrongdoing versus a $25 million baseline.
53. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1721 (discussing reputational and business
interests that incent firms to settle with the SEC); Johnson, supra note 44, at 664 (same).
54. Cf. Obeua S. Persons, The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive
Turnover and Compensation, 64 J. BUS. ETHICS 405, 418 (2006) (finding that revelations of fraud
or lawsuits increase the likelihood that firms decrease executive cash compensation or experience
executive turnover). But see Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Management
Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. & ECON. 309, 339
(1999) (“Anecdotal evidence from highly publicized cases suggests that top managers of firms
that are investigated or charged with criminal fraud lose their jobs . . . . [W]e find little systematic
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reputations.55 They may even wish to avoid personal liability.56 Like
enforcers, firms prefer finality in part because an ongoing investigation
or enforcement action can disrupt business operations.57 And even
firms that enter settlements fully intending to remediate may flag in
following through as competing business priorities with imminent
consequences emerge.58 Neither party, then, should be expected to
focus on recidivism prevention absent some mechanism that commits
it to that task.59
2. The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Corporate Reform. Entirely
successful enforcement deals lead to remedial efforts that are both
effective and efficient. As a matter of effectiveness, they should cause

evidence that firms suspected or charged with criminal fraud have unusually high turnover among
either senior managers or directors.”).
55. See Cathy Hwang, Faux Contracts, 105 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1064–65 (2019) (explaining that
an executive’s external contracting behavior may be influenced by a need to maintain personal
reputation within the firm); Robert Zinko, Gerald R. Ferris, Stephen E. Humphrey, Christopher
J. Meyer & Federico Aime, Personal Reputation in Organizations: Two-Study Constructive
Replication and Extension of Antecedents and Consequences, 85 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG.
PSYCH. 156, 172–73 (2012).
56. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1795
(2015) [hereinafter Garrett, Scapegoat] (“The higher-ups, who may control negotiations with
prosecutors, may themselves remain above the fray while lower-level employees are ‘thrown
under the bus.’”); see also id. at 1802 (observing that from 2001 to 2014, of 306 deferred- and
nonprosecution agreements entered into between firms and the DOJ, the DOJ pursued related
individual criminal charges in only 104 cases); id. at 1828 (speculating that corporate settlement
agreements include tacit agreements not to charge individual employees criminally); Khanna &
Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1721 (citing executives’ fear of corporate or personal criminal charges
as an incentive to settle).
57. More, the firm in some cases must disclose in its SEC filings that it is under investigation
or faces enforcement. This embarrassing disclosure could result in investor displeasure. Item 103
of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2020) (requiring disclosure of “material pending legal
proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business”); see also U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 pt. I, at 8 (n.d.) (requiring issuers to disclose the
information required by Item 103 of Regulation S-K).
58. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 727–28 (quoting an interviewee who explained that
there is a loss of reform momentum after settlement: “Just the everyday pressures that exist to do
whatever business it is, to deal with whatever crisis there is, gets in the way of actually completing
whatever it is people agree is the right thing to do”). The interviewee also explained that the
presence of a corporate monitor can create discipline that overcomes that lost momentum. Id.
But cf. infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text.
59. Cf. Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59,
69 (2001) (noting that private lawyers have little incentive to review contracts once they are signed
and that they tend rather to move on to the next transaction).
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the firm to achieve a target level of compliance.60 And as a matter of
efficiency, they should achieve that target at the least possible cost.
A no-violation effectiveness standard would mean that a law is
never violated by a firm’s employees or agents.61 A more forgiving noavoidable-violation standard, on the other hand, would excuse the firm
from liability for acts of rogue employees, those whose misconduct
could not have been deterred.62 Beyond these standards, compliance
targets can be set at de minimis, or nonactionable, violation levels.63
Ineffective remedial efforts are necessarily inefficient because
they imply the firm incurred costs that did not result in the desired level
of compliance. As an example, which recurs throughout this Article,
imagine a pharmaceutical company whose salesforce is found to have
engaged in systemic false off-label promotion.64 With an eye toward
remediation, the company decides that its target compliance level is for
sales representatives to never make product claims except those on
vetted talking points. It then invests heavily in retraining its salesforce
in those talking points. If representatives continue unabated to make
false off-label claims, this effort is both totally ineffective and totally
inefficient. But if retraining leads to some reduction in false off-label
claims, then the effort is only partially ineffective.
Even effective remedial efforts can be inefficient if they use more
resources than needed to achieve a given level of compliance. Imagine
that the pharmaceutical company’s remedial efforts go beyond the
salesforce retraining that was previously mentioned. It also changes its

60. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility and
inefficiency of total compliance).
62. Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 331–32 (2017); see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
63. See infra note 124 and accompanying text for discussion on setting acceptable compliance
levels.
64. Off-label drug promotion has traditionally been charged as unlawful misbranding under
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2018). See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2012) (listing
off-label-promotion prosecutions of GlaxoSmithKline, LLC; Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.;
Abbott Laboratories; and Allergan, Inc.). But see id. at 168 (construing the misbranding provision
“as not prohibiting and criminalizing the truthful off-label promotion of FDA-approved
prescription drugs”); FDA, MEDICAL PRODUCT COMMUNICATIONS THAT ARE CONSISTENT
WITH THE FDA-REQUIRED LABELING — QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (2018) (providing
guidance for medical-product firms to make truthful and nonmisleading off-label communications
“about the approved or cleared uses of a product” (footnote omitted)); FDA, DRUG AND DEVICE
MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS WITH PAYORS, FORMULARY COMMITTEES, AND SIMILAR
ENTITIES — QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 18 (2018) (addressing communications “regarding
unapproved uses of their approved/cleared/licensed products”).
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compensation plan to take into account an employee’s contributions to
compliance.65 And to ensure that salespeople do not engage in
improper sales practices, it requires all sales interactions to be recorded
and reviewed by an outside vendor. These efforts cost the firm by
losing high-performing salespeople who prefer the commission model,
plus engaging the vendor to review each sales call.66 Now imagine that
combining compensation changes and stricter monitoring with
retraining makes the difference: the company’s salesforce consistently
sticks to the approved script. Yet, if adding just the compensation
changes or just the sales monitoring would have gotten the firm to that
same level of compliance, it has overremediated. It paid for three
initiatives when two would have sufficed. Its remedial efforts are
effective but inefficient.
Ideally, settlement agreements would prescribe remediation that
is both effective and efficient, or they would create structures that
would yield such results even if they do not prescribe any particular
remediation program. As this Section explains, from the public’s
perspective, it is desirable that remediation programs work. It is also
desirable that they do so without requiring more resources than
necessary because every dollar spent on remediation is one that cannot
be spent on increasing wages, cutting prices, conducting research, or
paying dividends. As the next Section explains, however, that ideal can
break down in light of competing incentives and information
constraints among the two sides.
B. Competing Objectives in Corporate Reform
Who controls the reform process—a defendant’s management, the
enforcer, or other parties—can affect whether reform is effective and
efficient. This Section sketches several competing tensions between the
players that this Article’s follow-up approach can help reduce.

65. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L.: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT
§ 5.16(a) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019) (“An employee’s record of compliant or
noncompliant behavior should be considered as a factor in setting his or her compensation.”); cf.
FINRA MANUAL r. 3170 (FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., amended 2019), https://www.finra.org/
rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3170 [https://perma.cc/9LVR-S9M3] (requiring certain
broker-dealer firms to record all calls between salespersons and current or potential customers).
66. Audit-style compliance monitoring is especially costly to firms, both in the direct costs of
employing the auditors and the indirect costs of demotivating intrinsic ethical employee behavior.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with
Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 93–97.
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Management has practical control over the firm, as well as
expertise that could allow it to implement remedial efforts to reduce
recidivism.67 This control and expertise mean that management not
only can design and implement a reform plan, but it can also
periodically assess whether the plan is working and make any needed
course corrections.68 Managers’ incentives will make them sensitive to
remediating efficiently—even if they recognize value in reform (for
example, avoiding future penalties or reputational costs).69 But
enforcers, given their own public and reputational interests, will
prioritize effectiveness, even if they appreciate that inefficiency leads
to deadweight loss.70
Recidivism prevention is not, of course, management’s only
objective: it also needs to run a business. In balancing recidivism
prevention with other objectives, management thus seeks to optimize
reform efforts. It will avoid committing more resources—including
decisions around operations and whether to pursue business
opportunities—than necessary to achieve a target level of compliance.
Imagine, for example, that the pharmaceutical firm determines it can
prevent all avoidable recurrences of false off-label promotion by
dedicating 2 percent of its total personnel hours to sales-compliance
67. See Miller, supra note 49, at 260 (discussing management’s superior knowledge and
expertise in effecting reform within a specific firm).
68. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New
Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 337–38 (2008) (“[T]he reform
undertaking process should be flexible. To be successful, reform undertakings must be capable of
engaging in the experimentation necessary to determine what works, learn from past experience,
and be updated based on new information.”). Professor Veronica Martinez identifies four stages
of compliance process—prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation—and explains how
compliance failures can be better understood by looking at what stage of the process they
happened. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 219–25 (2019)
[hereinafter Root, Compliance Process]. This Article zooms into Martinez’s final stage—
remediation—and explains why it too is a process. See infra Part II.B (sketching the remediation
process).
69. SHARON ODED, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: NEW APPROACHES TO REGULATORY
ENFORCEMENT 10 (2013) (recognizing that compliance focuses on the agency problem between
firms and their employees).
70. But see Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Just., to the Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys 2 (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter
Morford Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/
morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN3P-53JV] (instructing
prosecutors to be mindful of “the cost of a monitor and its impact on the operations of a
corporation” when negotiating settlements); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1497–99 (1996) (recognizing that
nonmonetary corporate sanctions, such as probation, may impose higher social cost than cash
fines).
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efforts, such as training, auditing, and so on. If it in fact spends 4
percent of its personnel hours on these efforts, it will achieve no greater
reduction in recidivism, but it will have unnecessarily lost 2 percent of
its labor resources. Thus, by optimizing between reform costs and
reform benefits—namely, by hitting target compliance levels at the
least cost—management can avoid deadweight loss.71
Despite being positioned to effect reform, however,
management’s competency or motivation to do so is not a given.72 At
the extreme, managers who tolerated violations would lack the
motivation to credibly grapple with reforming their firms.73 Even in
instances in which management failed to recognize that violations were
occurring, or failed to prevent them despite trying to do so, enforcers
might fairly question whether it has the needed competency to lead the
reform process.74 When management lacks the motivation or the
competency to manage remediation credibly, there are three options:
replace management, bring in outsiders, or do both.75 Replacement is
most likely when executives bear some responsibility for corporate
wrongdoing or were negligent in preventing it.76 In rare cases, enforcers
might make the decision themselves, rather than waiting on the board
to act.77 Beyond these rare instances of direct control, enforcers can use

71. See infra Part II.B for a procedural discussion how management can go about optimizing
between these costs and benefits.
72. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1730 (observing that corporate recidivism
may be caused by “errant management”).
73. See Henning, supra note 14, at 1431 (noting that management may resist changes to
corporate culture, but that the threat of criminal prosecution will motivate boards of directors to
act to prevent recidivism).
74. But cf. Stone v. Ritter ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006)
(holding that directors’ good-faith failure to detect employees’ criminal conduct does not
necessarily breach a fiduciary duty); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the
Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1784 (2007) (predicting that “directors’
willingness to tolerate or engage in illegal conduct may be a proxy for their willingness to engage
in conduct that more directly diverges with the shareholders’ interests”).
75. In an interview, a regulator explained that the imposition of corporate monitors is
appropriate when prosecutors need to be persuaded “that there have been lapses but that [the
defendant is] committed to rectifying these wrongs, including terminating responsible people and
instituting new control mechanisms.” Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 699.
76. See supra note 33 (discussing two cases in which senior executives faced employmentrelated consequences for major compliance failures).
77. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2018) (permitting bank supervisors to remove a financial
institution’s officers, directors, or employees); 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f) (2018) (permitting the SEC to
bar individuals who commit securities fraud from serving as officers or directors of public
companies).
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their leverage in the settlement process to force personnel changes.78 A
firm might also preemptively discharge managers in hope of showing
the enforcer that remediation credit is justified.79
Whether changes in executive leadership occur or not, there is the
second question whether management has the motivation and
competency to achieve the firm’s reform goals. In some cases—
especially the most complex—management itself will not have the
expertise or resources it needs. In these instances, an enforcer requires
that outsiders—such as the enforcer itself, consultants, or monitors—
remain or become involved.80 These outsiders provide supervisory and
technical services.81 In their supervisory role, outsiders help firms
compensate for management’s lack of sufficient motivation by
monitoring its remedial efforts and postsettlement conduct.82 In their

78. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 701 (discussing the government’s bargaining
advantage over defendants given the severe consequences of charging decisions for firms).
79. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. to Jay
Holtmeier & Erin G.H. Sloane, Counsel to Johnson Controls, Inc. (June 21, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/874566/download [https://perma.cc/6J4L-KQW8] (declining
to charge Johnson Controls, Inc. for foreign bribery due in part to the company’s “separating . . .
16 employees found to be involved in the misconduct”). For a discussion why firms sometimes
implement remedial efforts with uncertainty as to how they will be valued in an enforcement deal,
see generally Part I.B.2.
80. Memorandum from Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to
all Crim. Div. Personnel 2 (Oct. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Benczkowski Memorandum], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1100531/download [https://perma.cc/9BCN-FXCW] (noting that
monitors should be imposed only when “there is a demonstrated need for, and clear benefit to be
derived from, a monitorship relative to the projected costs and burdens” and that when “a
corporation’s compliance program and controls are demonstrated to be effective and
appropriately resourced at the time of resolution, a monitor will likely not be necessary”); see also
Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1723 tbl.I (finding that DOJ DPAs or NPAs requiring the
appointment of monitor involved securities fraud (eleven cases), tax evasion (three cases), foreign
corruption or bribery (six cases), Bank Secrecy Act violations (two cases), healthcare fraud (two
cases), and unauthorized defense exports (one case)).
81. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 707–09 (describing the monitor as a continuum of
“advisor” to “auditor,” to “associate,” to “autocrat,” with each gradation having a mix of
supervisory and technical functions); see also Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33
YALE J. ON REG. 109, 126 (2016) [hereinafter Root, Monitorships] (“Importantly, [remedial
efforts] are activities each organization could have undertaken itself, but needed an outsider to
monitor because of the lack of trust stemming from its misconduct. The outsider was necessary to
assure that the organization was actually committed to reforming its past misconduct.”).
82. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2 (“A monitor’s primary responsibility is
to assess and monitor a corporation’s compliance with the terms of the agreement specifically
designed to address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the corporation’s misconduct . . . .”).
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technical role, they help firms compensate for management’s other
deficits by making remedial recommendations.83
Like management, outsiders also impose potential disadvantages
for achieving effective and efficient reform. Although enforcers may
understand the nature and causes of violations, they lack the
managerial expertise to design, implement, assess, and adjust
remediations.84 Enforcer-designed remedial efforts would thus
presumably be less effective than efforts led by managers, one concern
recognized by scholars as the “prosecutors in the boardroom”
problem.85 This problem of remedial expertise may appear in a wide
array of enforcers, but it will be particularly acute in generalist agencies
like criminal prosecutors. Beyond the difficulty enforcers face in
designing effective remedial efforts, they further lack management’s
efficiency incentives.86 Whereas managers must think about business
83. See id. at 1–2 (“As part of some negotiated corporate agreements, there have been
provisions pertaining to an independent corporate monitor. The corporation benefits from
expertise in the area of corporate compliance from an independent third party. The corporation,
its shareholders, employees and the public at large then benefit from reduced recidivism . . . .”
(footnote omitted)). Enforcers might also draw comfort from the presence of monitors because
monitors frequently have similar professional backgrounds to their own. Guidepost, a leading
provider of compliance consulting and monitor services, illustrates this point. Of the thirty-six
professionals it identified on August 7, 2019 as members of its compliance practice, twenty-one
were attorneys (fifteen of whom served as prosecutors or in other enforcement-related legal
roles); eight had held senior leadership roles in private businesses, and twelve had served in law
enforcement roles as special agents or analysts. Andrew K. Jennings, Guidepost Background
Survey (Aug. 7, 2019) (unpublished spreadsheet) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also
Our Trusted Experts, GUIDEPOST, https://www.guidepostsolutions.com/our-experts [https://
perma.cc/Q9PT-H5H7].
84. This lack of expertise is greater in generalist agencies (e.g., criminal prosecutors) than in
specialists (e.g., bank regulators). See Garrett, supra note 29, at 885 (“[Administrative a]gencies
not only often detect the underlying crimes in the DOJ’s cases, based on their own public
reporting regimes, but they have specialized expertise.”); Miller, supra note 49, at 260 (“The
government should not micromanage the requirements for an effective [compliance] program
. . . . No regulator or prosecutor can hope to know more about the internal workings of an
organization than the existing managers who spend their professional lives there.”).
85. See generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E.
Barkow eds., 2011) (presenting scholars’ analyses of normative and pragmatic implications for
prosecutor-driven corporate reform). Of course, when they sentence organizations, courts have
authority to directly mandate remedial efforts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(c), 3563(b) (2018)
(authorizing flexible probationary sentences of criminal organizations). Because courts also lack
managerial expertise, remedial sentencing could also exhibit the “prosecutors in the boardroom”
problem. In the case of judicial sentencing, the problem might be exacerbated by a court having
less understanding about the firm and its conduct than the enforcer who spent considerable time
conducting the investigation.
86. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1729 n.66 (“Of course, monitors are not
usually appointed to run the firm in a more profit-maximizing manner than management but
probably to run the firm in a more law-compliant manner.”).
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performance, enforcers have no direct efficiency incentives.87 Indeed,
an enforcer involved with planning remedial efforts might recognize
that it lacks expertise and compensate by requiring a long list of highly
detailed remedial efforts.88 It would do so without regard to cost,
hoping those efforts will achieve a desired level of recidivism
prevention, even if some in truth are redundant to that goal.89
An enforcer will participate in remediation on its own—whether
through tailoring remedial efforts, monitoring itself, or bringing in an
outsider—when it doubts management’s ability to lead the reform
process, particularly if it questions management’s follow-through.90 In
87. Miller, supra note 49, at 259 (“Governments have an incentive to require firms to
overspend on compliance programs. The reason is that regulators do not pay the costs of the
program, but obtain benefits by appearing ‘tough on crime’ and by deflecting blame for
violations.”). They might, of course, have indirect efficiency incentives, such as not wanting to
cause unnecessary reductions in a firm’s economic output, which could impose collateral costs on
a firm’s stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, and consumers. A speech by the
assistant attorney general in charge of DOJ’s Criminal Division belies the enforcer’s efficacy–
efficiency tension: “We want the corporate community to invest heavily in compliance, and do so
efficiently and effectively.” Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 36th International Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Dec. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Benczkowski Remarks], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarksamerican-conference [https://perma.cc/ME3C-BBSW].
88. The DOJ’s deferred-prosecution agreement with hedge fund Och-Ziff Capital
Management Group LLC over that firm’s bribery of foreign officials presents one potential
example of this phenomenon. The DOJ would not be expected to have expertise in the
management of hedge funds or how to reform them. In turn, its agreement with Och-Ziff ran
seventy-three pages, including seven pages specifying the remedial efforts the defendant was
expected to complete as part of the agreement. See Attachment C, Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at C-1 to C-7, United States v. Och-Ziff Capital Management Grp. LLP, No. 16-CR00516 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Och-Ziff DPA], https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
899306/download [https://perma.cc/UD3W-FL9Y] (laying out the seven measures defendant
must follow, including senior management commitments, periodic risk-based review, and
training). Even the Federal Trade Commission, whose expertise includes credit reporting, saw a
need to include nearly seven pages of specific information-security reforms in its settlement with
Equifax over the company’s 2017 cybersecurity breach. Stipulated Order for Permanent
Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 12–19, FTC v. Equifax, Inc., No. 19-CV-03297 (N.D. Ga.
July 23, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3203_equifax_order_
signed_7-23-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP88-4MDG].
89. See Miller, supra note 49, at 259 (noting that, although a compliance level for which the
marginal cost of compliance equals the marginal cost of avoided sanctions may be “socially
inefficient, regulators may avoid criticism by observing that it reduces the rate of violations”).
90. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 698 (interviewing a regulator who found monitorships
most appropriate when enforcers “don’t have enough assurance that [violations have] been
corrected, so the conduct or the problem might be ongoing”); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a)
(2018) (permitting the SEC to order that a firm that has violated federal securities laws “take
steps to effect compliance” with the securities laws, including orders “requir[ing] future
compliance or steps to effect future compliance, either permanently or for [a] period of time”);
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less complicated cases, it might require the firm to submit progress
reports.91 In harder cases, it might require the firm to hire a compliance
consultant or monitor and to take that person’s recommendations
seriously, or even agree presumptively to adopt them.92
The imposition of compliance consultants or monitors on firms
raises both effectiveness and efficiency concerns. Like enforcers,
consultants and monitors lack the firm-level expertise that
management has.93 They also do not share management’s efficiency
incentives.94 Nevertheless, consultants and monitors have sweeping
access to the company’s records, personnel, and decisionmaking. Their
recommendations must be taken seriously or even presumptively
adopted.95 These recommendations might push firms toward efficiently

18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(c), 3563(b)(22) (authorizing probationary sentences for organizations
convicted of criminal offenses and permitting a sentencing court to impose bespoke probation
conditions).
91. See, e.g., Walmart Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 86,159, Accounting & Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 4054, Administrative Proceeding No. 3-19207, 2019 WL 2552354, at
*11 (June 20, 2019) (“Respondent shall submit to the Commission staff a written report within
twelve (12) months . . . .”); Summit Fin. Grp., Inc., Inv. Advisers Act Release No. 5168,
Administrative Proceeding No. 3-19071, 2019 WL 1112742, at *3–7 (Mar. 11, 2019); Root,
Monitorships, supra note 81, at 120–21 (discussing an enforcer’s decision whether to engage in
direct monitoring or to require the engagement of a third-party monitor as being partly driven by
the enforcer’s capacity and the costs of monitoring).
92. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 70, at 6 (“If the corporation chooses not to adopt
recommendations made by the monitor . . . [t]he Government may consider this conduct when
evaluating whether the corporation has fulfilled its obligations under the agreement.”); see also,
e.g., UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. of PR, Securities Act Release No. 9318, Exchange Act No. 66,893,
Administrative Proceeding No. 3-14863, 2012 WL 1514678, at *10 (May 1, 2012) (requiring UBS
to implement its compliance consultant’s recommendations but allowing it to request
reconsideration of recommendations it considered “unduly burdensome or impractical”).
Professor Veronica Martinez observes that monitorships are heterogeneous in terms of their
roles, powers, and to whom they are accountable. In making that observation, she categorizes
monitorships into a typology of being court-ordered, enforcement-based, compliance-based, or
public-relations-based. See Root, Monitorships, supra note 81, at 142–47 (noting that
“monitorships are understood as heterogenous remediation tools”).
93. Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 714 (interviewing compliance consultants who expressed
concern that monitors, despite their investigative expertise, lack “experience in implementing and
evaluating compliance programs in a way that takes into account how those programs are
embedded in the corporation’s culture”).
94. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 70, at 5–6 (“Neither the corporation nor the
public benefits from employing a monitor whose role is . . . too broadly defined (and, therefore,
results in the monitor engaging in activities that fail to facilitate the corporation’s implementation
of the reforms intended by the parties).”).
95. See Root, Compliance Process, supra note 68, at 230–31 (recounting controversy surrounding
Michael Bromwich’s sprawling antitrust monitorship of Apple Inc.); Stephanie Saul, Bristol-Myers
Chief Fired Over Patent Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/
business/13bristolcnd.html [https://perma.cc/2MY4-MU4S] (reporting on the firing of the CEO of
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achieving reform objectives. But outsiders can also drive
overremediation—for example, when they act in view of maintaining
their reputations in the market for compliance services.96 That
objective can lead outsiders to recommend more remediation than is
necessary. After all, if a firm recidivates after its consultant or monitor
recommended what might be called “modest” remedial efforts, then
that violation might be partly blamed on the consultant or monitor.97
Overremediation can help outsiders avoid such criticism.
Outsiders can also impose rigidity. Corporate reform is a complex
undertaking.98 Initial remediation plans should not be expected to
achieve effective, efficient results without being adjusted during the
process.99 Although management has direct control over the firm and
can assess progress and course correct, the same flexibility is not a
given for remediation driven by outsiders.100 For instance, a firm might
be expected to adopt outsider recommendations.101 Course correction

Bristol-Myers Squibb after that action was recommended by the company’s monitor to its board of
directors).
96. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 729 (finding that, based on monitor interviews,
monitors seek to enhance their professional reputations and make decisions with an eye toward
obtaining future monitor appointments); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1736 (examining
potential conflicts of interest between a monitor and a firm, including the monitor’s reputational
incentives for future monitoring work); Veronica Root, Constraining Monitors, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2227, 2241 (2017) (“Reputational capital makes it important for monitors to manage their
conduct within the marketplace of entities that utilize monitoring services, but this incentive is
inherently self-interested on the part of the monitor who wants to obtain additional monitorship
engagements.”). But cf. Morford Memorandum, supra note 70, at 5 (“[A] monitor also is not an
agent or employee of the Government. While a monitor is independent both from the corporation
and the Government, there should be open dialogue among the corporation, the Government
and the monitor throughout the duration of the agreement.”).
97. Direct conflicts can also manifest in the monitor-firm relationship. Monitors often
practice at high-end law firms, meaning that they may charge fees that are financially material to
defendants. See Steven M. Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate Monitor, a Well-Paying Job but
Unknown Results, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014, 6:33 PM), https://nyti.ms/2kKaQNd [https://
perma.cc/XX5K-BGU5] (reporting that former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft received
$52 million in fees to serve as corporate monitor to Zimmer Holdings in connection with a
physician-kickback scheme).
98. See Root, Compliance Process, supra note 68, at 209 (“[T]he sheer breadth and diversity
of issues compliance programs must confront makes implementing effective compliance programs
an intensely challenging endeavor.”).
99. Id.
100. Cf. Miller, supra note 49, at 260 (“[R]egulatory requirements for compliance programs,
if articulated at an excessive level of detail, are doomed to be unwieldy, inefficient, and insensitive
to the particular circumstances and unique culture of any given organization.”).
101. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1724 (discussing the broad powers and
influence of monitors); see also Saul, supra note 95 (noting the monitor recommended the firing
of chief counsel).
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on plans that originate outside the firm could require making a formal
request or opening the firm up to renewed scrutiny. Although
contemporary monitorships often emphasize a flexible relationship
between monitors and firms102—including over what will be needed to
achieve reform objectives—a firm still has reason to avoid expressing
the need for course corrections. Doing so could signal, rightly or
wrongly, that it is struggling to achieve effective remediation, thus
harming the goodwill and credibility it earned up to that point.
Remedial rigidity thus may push firms to follow through with initial
plans, even if subsequent experience shows need for adjustment. These
conflicting interests between enforcers, firms, and third parties like
monitors are a key reason why a firm might not achieve effective,
efficient reform. The next Section examines how information
constraints can further frustrate that goal.
C. Uncertainty, Settlement, and Corporate Reform
After a company breaks the law, uncertainty abounds whether it
will do so again. That uncertainty presents considerable challenges for
incorporating recidivism prevention into the settlement process. This
Section sketches those challenges and explains how they can lead to
ineffective or inefficient remediation.
In settling enforcement actions, the public will pay the defendant,
in the form of forgone penalty revenue, for three kinds of up-front
mitigation: having an effective ex ante compliance program, selfreporting detected violations, and cooperating with an enforcer’s
investigation.103 The public will pay for these mitigations because they
aid enforcement and thus subsidize more robust policing than
enforcers’ resources would otherwise permit.104 Because each of these
mitigating efforts is completed at the time of settlement, the enforcer

102. See Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 551–53
(2014) (observing the need for a monitor to maintain a flexible stance that enables the monitored
firm to achieve reform objectives).
103. The maximum penalty revenue that the public might receive must incorporate the
probability that the government could succeed on the merits at trial and—if the court had
discretion—the probabilistic penalty the court would impose. See infra notes 138 and 140 and
accompanying text.
104. As then-SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes explained to an industry conference,
“[S]ometimes the best choice is not to bring a particular case or advance a particular charge. When
deciding how best to allocate the agency’s resources, the Commission has to make difficult
choices. Enforcement is no exception.” Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the 43rd Annual Rocky Mountain Securities Conference (May 6, 2011), http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch050611tap.htm [https://perma.cc/KG2Q-SN8T].
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can retrospectively consider their values and incorporate their “prices”
into the final settlement—that is, what discounts the firm receives on
the pecuniary or nonpecuniary sanctions that its past wrongdoing
would otherwise merit.
The public will also pay defendants for another, distinct type of
mitigation: remediation. Unlike ex ante compliance programs, selfreporting, and cooperation, remediation offers the public value not
because it helps enforcers detect and prosecute violations—thereby
subsidizing public enforcement—but rather because it stands to reduce
future violations.
Consider the following stylized example. Assume the enforcer
handling the exemplar off-label-promotion case assesses that the
appropriate penalty is $100 million.105 Then, after assessing the quality
of the defendant’s ex ante compliance program or self-reporting, its
cooperation during the investigation, and its remedial efforts, the
enforcer gives a $25 million credit for each. The net penalty—what the
company must pay—is $25 million.
Appropriate penalty
Compliance/self-reporting
Cooperation
Remediation
Net penalty

$100,000,000
($25,000,000)
($25,000,000)
($25,000,000)
$25,000,000

Unlike the other mitigating efforts, remediation will occur both
before and after settlement. Its value thus cannot be fully assessed at
settlement because whether the firm will recidivate—and, if so, to what
extent—is necessarily unknown at that point. The following timeline
illustrates the temporal alignment. A firm first has an ex ante
compliance program that allows it to detect a potential violation. Then,
it self-reports that potential violation to an enforcer, which opens a
case. Next, it cooperates with the enforcer’s investigation, such as by
conducting its own costly internal investigation. Finally, the parties
reach a settlement. From the investigative stage on past settlement, the
firm might take remedial efforts, or undertake future efforts, that align
with reducing its recidivism risk. At settlement, the enforcer can review
105. How the government should price penalties, and the value of mitigation, is beyond this
Article’s scope. From a neoclassical standpoint, pricing should be based on the social cost of
violations and the social value of recidivist violations avoided. See Miller, supra note 49, at 256
(offering an effective-compliance model that assumes sanctions are set at their social cost).
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the quality of the firm’s ex ante compliance, self-reporting, and
cooperation, assign prices to those mitigations based on their value to
the enforcer, and set penalty credits accordingly. Because recidivism
risk and future remediation are prospective in nature, however, the
enforcer’s pricing for remediation is necessarily predictive.

FIGURE 1: CLAWBACK ENFORCEMENT

Given this temporal alignment, the current approach of giving upfront credit for completed or promised remediation fails to account
adequately for the uncertainty around recidivism, creating three
challenges for corporate reform. First, it can lead to the public paying
for recidivism prevention by accepting lower penalties, even in cases
when defendants’ remedial efforts will not be successful at effecting the
reform that was implicitly bargained for. Second, it forgoes
opportunities to generate data that can advance ex ante and ex post
compliance, thus indirectly contributing to more violations. Third, it
incents enforcers to compensate for uncertainty by requiring more
presettlement remediation than is necessary, which tends to cause
firms to overinvest in remediation, a deadweight loss.106
1. The Effectiveness Challenge. Corporate compliance emerges
from vicarious liability and the enforcement practices that have grown
up in its shadow. Whether compliance or remedial efforts are effective,
however, has remained an elusive question that frustrates the ability of
corporate enforcers to make optimal policing and sanctioning
decisions.
Firms are strictly liable for violations that are committed by
employees in the course of their employment and with some intent to

106. See Khanna, supra note 70, at 1503–04 (explaining that nonmonetary penalties’
variability can lead to suboptimal sanctioning effects).
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benefit the firm.107 As a result, a firm sometimes finds itself responsible
for the misconduct of a rogue employee who acts contrary to its
genuine wishes or whose acts ultimately serve to victimize it.108 As
Professor Jennifer Arlen observes, the starkness of that doctrine has
the potential to undermine law enforcement objectives.109 Although a
firm is liable for its employees’ misconduct, it is individual employees
who ultimately decide whether to engage in unlawful conduct. A firm
that knows it will be held vicariously liable for its employees’
misconduct has no incentive to assist the government in detecting and
prosecuting those individual acts.110 Because the government lacks the
resources to detect most corporate violations without the assistance of
insiders, vicarious liability can serve to hide misconduct from
enforcers.111
Against these concerns, vicarious liability is modified by policies
that encourage firms to prevent and detect employee misconduct and
to cooperate with enforcers when violations do happen. Under the
federal organizational sentencing guidelines, a court may mitigate a
firm’s criminal sentence if it has an “effective compliance and ethics
program,” or if it demonstrates “self-reporting, cooperation, or
acceptance of responsibility.”112 To qualify, a compliance program
must be “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [it]
is generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct,”
although a “failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not
necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective.”113 The

107. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909).
108. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that Fox’s compliance program and lack of willfulness do not immunize it from its
employee’s violations); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972).
109. See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial
Discretion To Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 85,
at 62, 69 (“In the 1990s, federal authorities abandoned the [strict-liability] approach to corporate
criminal liability because it could not achieve its primary goal—deterring corporate crime . . . .”).
110. See id. at 71–72 (observing that vicarious liability discourages firms from engaging in
monitoring or reporting employee criminal conduct or cooperating with the government in
prosecuting those crimes because doing so would increase their own criminal exposure).
111. Id. See generally Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle
on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2215–16 (2010) (examining the attributes of internal
whistleblowers who report corporate wrongdoing to the government).
112. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7UC9-LCPD].
113. Id. § 8B2.1. Although this guideline only directly applies to criminal cases, it has been
influential in the civil-enforcement context, too.
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”),114 Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”),115 and other enforcers’ policies also offer
penalty credit for the presence of an “effective” ex ante compliance
program, policies that go beyond the organizational sentencing
guidelines in encouraging firms to police internal misconduct.116 In
extraordinary cases, enforcers might even justify a declination by
looking to a firm’s ex ante compliance efforts, as well as other factors
like self-reporting and cooperation.117
This easing of vicarious liability, coupled with a secular increase in
corporate enforcement,118 has helped fuel compliance’s rise.119
Investment in compliance has been substantial. Firms annually spend
114. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1.
115. Report of Investigation and Statement, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, Accounting &
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma.cc/5274-LBA7].
116. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (providing reduced penalties for
environmental violations by firms that, among other things, have a “compliance management
system reflecting the regulated entity’s due diligence in preventing, detecting, and correcting
violations”). The Department of Health and Human Services splits its compliance guidance
among topical areas. See, e.g., OIG Supplement Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Facilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 56,832, 56,834 (Sept. 30, 2008) (“[A]n effective compliance program
demonstrates a nursing facility’s good faith effort to comply with applicable statutes, regulations,
and other Federal health care program requirements, and may significantly reduce the risk of
unlawful conduct and corresponding sanctions.”).
117. Press Release, Andrew Weissman, Chief, Fraud Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 7–9 (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/
V9UZ-UCTF] (offering that companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate, and
appropriately remediate may be considered for a declination for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
violations).
118. An analysis of DOJ criminal corporate settlements (plea agreements, NPAs, and DPAs),
found eleven agreements in 1997, which fairly steadily climbed to roughly forty per year in 2011.
Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An
Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred-Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 537, 566 (2015).
119. See generally DAVID STRACHAN & REBECCA WALSH, DELOITTE, THE CHANGING ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/FinancialServices/gx-financial-changing-role-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8N2-7D5R] (noting the myriad
responsibilities of the Chief Compliance Officer); EY, A TIME OF EVOLUTION FOR COMPLIANCE:
LAYING FOUNDATIONS FOR FUTURE SUCCESS (2016), https://www.eycom.ch/en/Publications/
20160309-Global-Insurance-CCO-Survey/download [https://perma.cc/8AEY-X9SB] (same); OLIVER
BEVAN, PIOTR KAMINSKI, IDA KRISTENSEN, THOMAS POPPENSIEKER & AZRA PRAVDIC,
M C K INSEY & C O ., T HE C OMPLIANCE F UNCTION AT AN I NFLECTION P OINT (2019), https://
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Risk/Our%20Insights/
The%20compliance%20function%20at%20an%20inflection%20point/The-compliance-function-atan-inflection-point-vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9F8-3LKT] (reporting survey results about the efficiency
and effectiveness of compliance departments at leading international banking institutions).
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tens of billions of dollars on compliance and ethics programs.120 Even
if a firm does not imminently face an enforcement action, it has good
reason to invest in an “effective” compliance program because doing
so will earn it credit in the form of a lighter penalty, or even a
declination, should a violation occur and be disclosed.121 In other
words, contemporary enforcement policy offers firms a unilateral deal:
if you implement a compliance program that will prevent violations or

120. See Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Costs U.S. Financial Services Firms $25.3
Billion Per Year, According to LexisNexis Risk Solutions, LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLS. (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20181010-true-cost-aml
[https://
perma.cc/35GP-RYNJ] (estimating that U.S. financial institutions annually spend between 0.08
and 0.83 percent of total assets on anti-money-laundering compliance); Peter Farley, Spotlight on
Compliance Costs as Banks Get Down to Business, INT’L BANKER (July 4, 2017), https://
internationalbanker.com/technology/spotlight-compliance-costs-banks-get-business-ai [https://
perma.cc/42SY-8QVY] (estimating that tier-one banks collectively spend $270 billion annually
on compliance); Nicole Lindsey, Global 500 Faces GDPR Compliance Costs of $7.8 Billion, CPO
MAG. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/global-500-faces-gdprcompliance-costs-of-7-8-billion [https://perma.cc/HRT5-6L2E].
121. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP.
L. 769, 781–82 (2014) (“Although the [Sentencing] Guidelines seek to deter corporate crime, the
payoff ironically comes after the firm’s agents commit a crime for which the firm is liable and
sentenced.”). Looking at corporate-sentencing data might make a firm question this investment,
however. In 2018, for example, only one sentenced business organization (of ninety-nine)
received effective-compliance-program credit. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT
AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 174 tbl.O-4 (2018), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC3R-HLG4]. Since 2009,
only a limited number of defendants received the credit: one (of forty-seven) organizational
defendants received that credit in 2016, Table 54—Organizations Sentenced Under Chapter Eight:
Culpability Factors, Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/Table54.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JT9M-4YWB], two (of 55) in 2014, Table 54—Organizations Sentenced Under Chapter
Eight: Culpability Factors, Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table54_
revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/98S4-K2BT], and one (of 65) in 2013, Table 54—Organizations
Sentenced Under Chapter Eight: Culpability Factors, Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/2013/Table54.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MXM-JJDV]. Professor Jennifer Arlen
suggests that the Sentencing Commission does “not grant enough mitigation for adopting
effective compliance programs,” leading to a failure to adequately incent firms to detect and
report internal crimes. Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321, 361–62 (2012). Apart from external incentives, however, implementing
an appropriate compliance program might also fulfill directors’ fiduciary duties, as is the case for
Delaware corporations. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373
(Del. 2006) (holding that good faith can be measured “by the directors’ actions ‘to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists’” (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996))).
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detect them if they do occur and report detected violations to the
government, then you will receive credit.122
The difficulty, however, is that despite decades of firms
committing enormous financial and other resources to compliance
programs, uncertainty remains whether they work. In large part, a lack
of empiricism—the absence of compliance objectives that are
measurable and are measured—drives this uncertainty.
First, there is the threshold question what a compliance program
is to achieve. In any sufficiently complex organization, total compliance
is infeasible and economically inefficient.123 Although management has
some control over the firm’s compliance, it cannot deter every
employee from engaging in misconduct, especially when misconduct
benefits the employee personally.124 If firms cannot prevent every
violation, then there is some level short of total compliance that they
must accept.125 Among compliance levels that are feasible to achieve,
the firm will attempt to optimize between cost, compliance
improvements that advance its business goals, and what enforcers will
tolerate (that is, unprevented violations would not be frequent or
egregious enough to justify an inquiry or to foreclose “effective”
program credit).126 Recall, for example, the pharmaceutical company
discussed in Part I. It cannot ensure that its employees will never
122. Stucke, supra note 121, at 800 (“[T]he Guidelines adopt an implied contract. If a firm
undertakes compliance . . . then courts will reduce the firm’s future penalty . . . .”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 32 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“In case of doubt an offer is
interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests
or by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses.”).
123. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (analyzing the
optimality of corporate compliance efforts in view of the social welfare they produce).
124. The organizational sentencing guidelines allow for this scenario. See U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UC9-LCPD] (“The failure to
prevent or detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”).
125. See Becker, supra note 15, at 170 (explaining that the optimal amount of enforcement as
“depend[ing] on . . . the cost of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishments—
for example, whether they are fines or prison terms—and the responses of offenders to changes
in enforcement”).
126. See Krawiec, supra note 17, at 542 (finding support for the conclusion that “internal
compliance structures are largely window-dressing mechanisms implemented by corporate
management to reduce liability or provide the appearance of legitimacy to corporate stakeholders
and the marketplace at large”); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 719 (“For some
corporations, compliance programs are simply a cost that they try to minimize. The company
seeks to ‘buy’ just enough of a compliance program that is it has some protection in the event that
internal wrongdoing comes to light.”).
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violate a law. It can, however, ensure that its salesforce does not
systemically make false off-label claims, pay kickbacks to physicians, or
engage in other improper sales practices, even if on occasion a sales
representative does do one of those things.127
Second, there is the question whether the compliance objective is
measurable. For the pharmaceutical firm, outcomes along the lines of
“our salesforce will act in accordance with applicable law and our code
of conduct” cannot be assessed in a quantitative sense. However, an
objective that “our salesforce will not make off-label claims and will
not pay kickbacks” can be measured. With proper instruments, did
these things happen, how often did they happen, who did them, and
what were the circumstances are reasonably knowable.
And third, there are the questions whether the firm is achieving its
compliance objectives, whether it has appropriate metrics for assessing
whether it is doing so, and whether it has instruments for generating
the data.128 Hui Chen, the DOJ’s inaugural in-house compliance expert,
and Professor Eugene Soltes identify the lack of compliance
measurability as a key explanation for why some firms face significant
enforcement actions despite having implemented compliance “best
practices,” like ethics training and codes of conduct.129 Even when firms
do attempt to measure their compliance performance, these efforts
often fall short due to pitfalls like incompleteness and misalignment.130
Compliance data can be incomplete—for example, a firm might point
to employees it has discharged for misconduct while missing those who
127. Professor Todd Haugh warns, however, that merely identifying systemic issues may be
inadequate because “unethical acts in complex organizations do not necessarily pop up one-byone in a typical and predictable manner, so that they may be easily managed by standard
compliance tools.” Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129,
179–80 (2018) (theorizing that compliance failures are driven by a few outlier actors within an
organization, rather than being normally distributed).
128. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2105–06 (2016) (observing that “compliance metrics track activity rather than impact” and thus
the “metrics . . . do not answer the crucial question of efficacy”). In a survey of corporate compliance
leaders, 53 percent reported analyzing internal audit findings to measure their compliance programs’
efficacy. DELOITTE, IN FOCUS: 2016 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 10 (2017), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/governance-risk-compliance/us-advisorycompliance-week-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTB6-T7P5]. Other methods included analyzing
training completion (50 percent), ethics hotline calls (47 percent), employee surveys (39 percent), and
proactive monitoring procedures (30 percent). Id. Despite these efforts, only 32 percent of respondents
reported that they were confident or very confident that these sources offered appropriate measures of
compliance effectiveness. Id.
129. Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail: And How To Fix Them,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116, 119, 123.
130. Id. at 122.
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engaged in misconduct but went undetected.131 Or assessment data
might not actually align with whether a company is compliant, like
when a firm points to completion rates for its ethics training without
evidence that the training had an effect on conduct.132
In a roundtable discussion, Professors Soltes, Reinier Kraakman,
and Karl Hofstetter considered the “major weakness” stemming from
“lack of reliable quantitative data” for measuring the effectiveness of
the compliance process, predicting noncompliance, informing
managers about compliance performance, and benchmarking
compliance across firms.133 They reasoned that the lack of data around
compliance impairs the ability of firms to undertake effective and
efficient compliance efforts.134 They further hypothesized that a
collective action problem in which firms keep their compliance data
confidential as trade secrets despite the potential for cross-firm gains
from data aggregation is partly to blame for compliance’s missing
empiricism.135 Another driver of this collective action problem might
even be compliance itself. Firms might not share compliance data with
competitors for fear of running afoul of antitrust laws.136 Of course, fear
of embarrassment over unflattering data might also motivate firms to
keep their compliance data secret.
Enforcers, as consumers of compliance data, have the potential to
overcome this collective action problem. The DOJ and SEC, for
instance, are among the leading consumers of compliance data given
that they must evaluate firms’ compliance efforts as part of their
enforcement activities. They could use their presettlement leverage to
require firms to produce comparable compliance or remediation data
that could be aggregated to provide a relatively rigorous understanding

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Reinier Kraakman, Eugene Soltes & Karl Hofstetter, Compliance, Compensation and
Corporate Wrongdoing 8 (May 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3373718 [https://perma.cc/F8AQ-P92N].
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Bus. Scholarship Podcast, Veronica Root Martinez on the Compliance
Process, ANDREW K. JENNINGS, at 15:10 (Oct. 24, 2019), https://andrewkjennings.com/2019/10/24/
veronica-root-martinez-on-the-compliance-process [https://perma.cc/D2H7-66ZW] (recounting
one chief compliance officer’s reluctance to share compliance data with competitors for fear that
doing so could violate antitrust laws); Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 29, at 54 (“Individual
companies . . . have incentives not to share information about compliance failures, lest they risk
liability. Nor do companies have strong incentives to share information about compliance
successes, lest their competitors use their strategies too.”).
136. See Bus. Scholarship Podcast, supra note 135.
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of what works and how. Their existing policies for evaluating
compliance programs, however, suggest that they too lack empirically
rigorous standards for ex ante compliance or ex post remediation, and
for testing whether those standards have been achieved.137
For example, in its 2001 Seaboard Report, the SEC articulated
when it will give penalty credit to public companies that “seek out, selfreport and rectify illegal conduct, and otherwise cooperate with
Commission staff.”138
In assessing remediation, the SEC asks several questions:
What steps did the company take upon learning of the
misconduct? Did the company immediately stop the misconduct? Are
persons responsible for any misconduct still with the company? If so,
are they still in the same positions? . . . Did the company take steps to
identify the extent of damage to investors and other corporate
constituencies? . . .
What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur?
Did the company adopt and ensure enforcement of new and more
effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent a
recurrence of the misconduct? Did the company provide our staff
with sufficient information for it to evaluate the company’s measures
to correct the situation and ensure that the conduct does not recur?139

These questions are relevant for assessing the effectiveness of a
firm’s remedial efforts, of course, but they do not suggest an empirical
framework for answering them. The DOJ Criminal Division advanced
that goal when it released its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs guidance.140 Broadly, the guidance represents the most
thorough statement to date for how the government should evaluate
ex ante compliance or ex post remediation. It instructs line prosecutors
in assessing ex ante compliance programs when making charging and
settlement decisions,141 as well as evaluating the need for
postenforcement monitors.142 It emphasizes the importance of
assessing effectiveness—though, due to the uncertainty around

137. See Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast To Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1126–28 (2016)
(questioning the indeterminacy of government-driven corporate reform programs that are not
empirically founded).
138. Report of Investigation and Statement, supra note 115.
139. Id.
140. EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 1.
141. Id. (citing DOJ Manual, supra note 3, § 9-28.300).
142. Id. (citing Benczkowski Memorandum, supra note 80, at 2).
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recidivism at the time of settlement, it does so by looking for indicia of
effectiveness rather than direct tests for whether efforts prevent
violations.143 This guidance represents a significant step forward for
compliance empiricism.144 But even it leaves unanswered more
concrete questions: What outcomes should compliance efforts
produce, and how can firms’ compliance be measured against them?
Under either policy, assessing whether efforts have prevented
violations is ultimately left to enforcers’ qualitative judgments. This
approach to assessing compliance might work reasonably well in
posterior cases: an enforcer can look to a firm’s misconduct and
compliance program to make a judgment whether the program was
adequate to prevent the kind of misconduct that occurred,
notwithstanding that it did. That assessment requires looking at
historical conditions and drawing causal conclusions between the two,
something a careful qualitative analysis can achieve. As the next
paragraphs explain, however, qualitative assessment is less certain in
its ability to predict what effects, if any, remedial efforts done by or
agreed to at settlement will have months and years later.
2. The Knowledge Challenge. The uncertainty over what works in
ex ante compliance implies even greater uncertainty over what
remedial efforts will work in a firm that has already failed to comply
with the law.145 By giving up-front credit for remediation, enforcers
face a double uncertainty. First, they do not know generally whether
those efforts work at effecting compliance. Second, they do not know
whether efforts will work at a specific firm.146 Or, as explained below,
initial efforts might prove ineffective and reaching a desired outcome
will take periodic assessment and adjustment—an iterative, rather than
one-step, process.147 This uncertainty allocates recidivism risk onto the

143. See id. at 14–15. But see Krawiec, supra note 17, at 491–92 (“[T]he indicia of an effective
compliance system are easily mimicked and true effectiveness is difficult for courts and regulators
to determine . . . .”).
144. See Aloke Chakravarty & Sam Ballingrud, Insight Into the DOJ’s Updated Guidance on
Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, CORP. COUNS. (July 24, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://
advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/71207bd8-15f2-4a0c-961b-2cb2ba47467b [https://perma.cc/CT9Z2FKG] (discussing how to conform compliance programs to the DOJ guidance).
145. Cf. Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 29, at 51 (“[C]ompanies have no way to know, ex ante,
which compliance measures will succeed in preventing violations . . . .”).
146. Cf. Root, Monitorships, supra note 81, at 128 (“The necessary remediation effort in these
instances—which involves an overhaul of the organization’s corporate compliance program with
respect to the area of misconduct—is difficult for the government to delineate at the outset.”).
147. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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public. It pays the firm by discounting the penalty at the time the
settlement is agreed to, whereas the firm’s performance in the future is
uncertain.148
Giving up-front credit partly drives this challenge in that by
essentially locking in a plan at the start of remediation, firms have less
flexibility to recalibrate their reform processes and share the resulting
data with enforcers.149 If, however, these data were generated and
available to enforcers, then subsequent defendants would be able to
incorporate past learnings into their own remediation plans. This
practice would spur a virtuous cycle in which iterative rounds of
corporate remediation improve understanding of what works most
efficiently. For example, enforcers could standardize and de-identify
data and make it available to researchers, firms, and providers of
compliance services for use in testing and improving ex ante
compliance or designing ex post remediation. By implication, not
producing these data risks there being more recidivism than would
have occurred with the benefit of that knowledge.
The knowledge challenge also manifests in missing opportunities
to advance ex ante compliance. One explanation for limited empiricism
in compliance is a collective action problem:150 firms do not share their
compliance data, stymying the development of knowledge that would
be useful to firms generally. Enforcers, however, are well positioned to
overcome this problem.151 They regularly work adjacent to complex
remediations and have leverage through the settlement process to
require data sharing.152 Making some form of these data publicly

148. With this public-borne risk, as the next subsection suggests, the measurement challenge
can lead not only to ineffective reform outcomes, but it can also cause enforcers to
overcompensate and, as a result, firms to overremediate.
149. The DPA and stipulated order for Och-Ziff and Equifax, discussed supra note 88, for
example, were both approved by a federal court and contain detailed remedial undertakings. If
the remediation process revealed that new terms were needed to accomplish the goals embodied
by the settlements, the defendants would need not only to obtain the consent of the DOJ or the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), but also the courts, to amend them. Those amendments
would also become publicly available, subjecting the defendants to a new round of negative press.
Given such barriers, firms would be unlikely to seek changes, even if they were merited and would
better serve to prevent recidivism.
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
151. See Van Loo, supra note 36, at 384–95 (tracing the rise of regulatory agencies as data
collectors, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s mandatory collection of
employee demographic data from larger employers).
152. Indeed, it is already common for enforcers to require production of postsettlement data.
For examples of such requirements, see sources cited supra note 91 (SEC agreements) and infra
note 190 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services agreements).
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available would foster richer understanding for why violations happen
and how they can be prevented.153 These data would thus be a public
good for use in deterring violations.154 Giving up-front remediation
credit, however, does not foster this sharing or public-good production,
implying that violations will occur that could have been prevented.155
3. The Overremediation Challenge. Because postsettlement
enforcement under the clawback approach has limited credibility,
enforcers may seek, and firms may undertake, remedial efforts that
overremediate. Overremediation, of course, undermines the ideal that
corporate reform be both effective and efficient. Enforcers are not
ignorant to reform’s uncertain nature.156 Their use of compliance
consultants and monitors, as well as of DPAs and NPAs with clawback
authority, shows uncertainty at settlement about recidivism. A
consultant or monitor, for instance, allows an enforcer to pull back
from an action and turn its resources to other priorities, assured that
someone is there to push the firm toward not recidivating.157 Setting a
forward-looking period, whether it is one, three, or five years, in a DPA
or NPA allows the enforcer at least the opportunity of doing a rough,
high-level evaluation of the firm’s remediation outcome.158 It also
keeps pressure on the firm not to recidivate, at least not to a degree
that would draw a new enforcement action.159 But, as noted earlier,

153. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 736 (observing that greater capture of lessons learned
from monitorships would create a virtuous circle for enhancing the quality of subsequent
monitorships).
154. See id.
155. See id. (explaining that postmonitorship would foster sharing and public-good
production); Garrett, Scapegoat, supra note 56, at 1838 (“The structural reform of a leading
company can set a model for industry and assist in broader efforts by regulators to promote best
practices to prevent violations from happening in the first instance.”).
156. If a firm could credibly promise at the end of an enforcement matter that it has learned
its lesson and will not break the law again, then there would be no need to mitigate its punishment
for undertaking remedial efforts.
157. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1730 (explaining one rationale for monitors
as allowing enforcers to “subcontract[]” postsettlement supervision of firms and to transfer the
cost of that supervision to firms themselves).
158. One study found twelve to thirty-six months to be the norm, although duration extended
as high as sixty months. Id. at 1723 tbl.I; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing
typical durations of the DOJ’s DPAs and NPAs).
159. A firm might face consequences under a settlement (for example, loss of prior benefits)
for subsequently charged offenses, but not for offenses that went undetected. This standard,
though, risks that low-level violations numerous enough to reflect an aggregate failure of reform
will go unnoticed or underenforced by enforcers. It also reduces firm incentives to monitor its
organization and to self-report and remedy detected issues. In some cases, of course, the firm can
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enforcers are not motivated to use their clawback authority, making
the loss of settlement benefits a less-than-credible threat to would-be
recidivists.
Beyond these explicit mechanisms, enforcers might also implicitly
compensate for reform’s uncertain nature. Two assumptions illustrate
this point. First, an enforcer is uncertain whether a firm will recidivate
and whether given remedial efforts will prevent recidivism. Second, it
prefers finalizing the case, not wanting to police old settlements or use
its clawback option. Under these assumptions, the enforcer will insist
on seeing greater presettlement remedial efforts than are necessary to
effect reform, or remedial efforts that are substantial but, in truth,
poorly align with problems at that firm.160 In this way, if it has a limited
window to influence the course of the firm’s remediation, then, because
it values effectiveness above efficiency,161 the enforcer will want the
firm to apply as much effort as possible to fix the root causes of its
violations. As part of this push, the enforcer will expect firms to adopt
“industry-standard” compliance efforts, even if those efforts are not
well aligned to the problems at the firm.162 This kind of implicit
compensation for reform uncertainty, however, creates the potential
for overremediation, a deadweight loss.163
This compensating behavior can occur even if the enforcer takes a
naïve or passive approach to remediation. Firms will act in anticipation
of enforcers’ preferences if those preferences are not explicitly stated.
be required to self-report yet undetected offenses. See, e.g., Walmart Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 86,159, Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release No. 4054, Administrative Proceeding
No. 3-19207, 2019 WL 2552354, at *11 (June 20, 2019) (requiring Walmart Inc. to report to the
SEC previously undetected foreign bribes made by the company).
160. See Armour et al., supra note 50, at 50 (discussing the potential for “defensive decisionmaking” to cause overinvestments in compliance); Langevoort, supra note 66, at 113, 115
(explaining why compliance-program evaluators tend to be biased toward more substantial
compliance monitoring, even when lighter programs would be reasonable).
161. Langevoort, supra note 66, at 113, 115.
162. See Krawiec, supra note 17, at 536 (“[C]ourts and regulatory bodies frequently measure
compliance with the law against the industry standard, with little inquiry into the role played by
the regulated group and other self-interested actors in establishing those standards.”); see also
GARRETT, supra note 19, at 277 (“Telling a company to just adopt ‘best practices’ does not give
real guidance; prosecutors should impose provisions explaining how compliance should be
implemented.”).
163. See Miller, supra note 49, at 259 (“Governments have an incentive to require firms to
overspend on compliance programs.”). See generally WILLIAM M. HANNAY, III, JEFFREY M.
KAPLAN & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES (2020) (offering practitioner-oriented guidance on designing compliance programs
that align to the prevention and detection expectations of the organizational sentencing
guidelines).
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Credit for remedial efforts is not binary. A firm that does more to
convince an enforcer that it has lowered its recidivism risk will receive
more credit than one that has done less.164 But there is also a minimum
threshold of remedial efforts an enforcer must see before giving any
credit. Remedial efforts must reduce recidivism risk at a scale that
evidences commitment to reform.165 Below that threshold, any
remedial efforts will not be credited.166 Returning, for example, to the
pharmaceutical company caught making false off-label claims, the firm
would likely receive no remediation credit merely for sending an email
reminder to the salesforce about its ethics policy, but it might receive
some credit if it also requires employees to attend new salescompliance trainings.
Beyond the minimum remediation credit, enforcers are willing to
give a maximum credit that is capped at no more than the firm’s total
potential penalty. The enforcer will pay for remediation through a
discount, but not out of pocket. Thus, if the pharmaceutical firm
mandates new training, then it might receive the minimum credit. But
if it institutes new training plus compliance-incenting compensation
policies, then it might receive the maximum credit. If it also implements
universal monitoring of sales calls in addition to the new training and
compensation policies, it will still only receive the maximum. So, it has
overremediated, at least as far as its penalty incentives are concerned.
The enforcer assigns a maximum value to recidivism prevention.
It will pay only if there is expected to be some minimal recidivism
prevention. And it will pay in proportion to the substantialness of the
firm’s remedial efforts at settlement. The parties cannot know at
settlement whether the firm will recidivate. If they are willing to make
reasonable assumptions about how effective remedial efforts will be at
reducing the risk, then they can bargain for an approximately optimal
deal. The enforcer pays only for a given level of recidivism-risk
reduction, and the firm only undertakes efforts needed to earn that
level of credit. But two interrelated effects can thwart such a roughly
optimal deal.

164. Miller, supra note 49, at 248–49.
165. See Soltes, supra note 13, at 1001–03 (recognizing that compliance falls along a
continuum and considering what conditions must exist to demonstrate a “minimally sufficient”
compliance program).
166. See id. at 1002 (stating that to assess a compliance program, the firm should demonstrate
the effectiveness of the program).
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First, the enforcer does not disclose the specific criteria it will use
to evaluate remedial efforts for credit purposes, nor the function it will
use for determining how much credit a given level of remedial effort is
worth.167 Indeed, it may not know itself.168 Although firms will want to
tout their remedial efforts during settlement negotiations, they must
first institute those efforts without knowing how the enforcer will
evaluate them. They know that the enforcer expects to see efforts that
it is satisfied will reduce the risk of recidivism occurring—above the
avoidable level, that is.169 Below that threshold, there is no credit. They
also know that there is a maximum credit the enforcer will give.170 But
they do not know what remedial efforts will satisfy the threshold
condition or what the remediation-to-credit function is once they reach
the threshold condition. This information constraint on the firm’s part
will tend to cause overinvestment in remediation if it believes that the
credit it will receive is larger than the cost of the efforts it will offer.171
Overremediation occurs because—without knowing the maximum and

167. Cf. id. at 975 n.24 (observing that without disclosure of these standards, firms will be
unable to determine if they are in compliance); Stucke, supra note 121, at 787 (“The problem is
that no one, except the DOJ, knows the extent to which firms’ compliance efforts resulted in their
avoiding criminal liability or a lower fine.”).
168. An enforcer is not an expert in remediation or the organizational structure or functions
of the firm, even if it—over the course of an investigation—gradually becomes more
knowledgeable about the firm and the causes of its offenses. Given the limits of its knowledge
even after extensive investigation, it is unlikely at the outset of a case to have a clear expectation
what remedial efforts it will credit and how much credit it will grant for a given level of expected
recidivism reduction.
169. The avoidable level is the level of violations that management—through its management,
cultural, ethical, and other interventions—has the ability to prevent. Below that is the
unavoidable level: even organizations that are deeply committed to compliance would be
expected to have occasional rogue employees, especially if they are relatively large. See supra
notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
170. The maximum possible discount is a complete waiver of penalties and undertakings, a
declination. Beyond that, there is a local maximum (which, when the enforcer exercises discretion
not to charge a prosecutable case, is the same as the global maximum). That local maximum may
be explicitly known by an enforcer, or it may be revealed only through negotiations between the
parties. See Vivi Nastase, Concession Curve Analysis for Inspire Negotiations, 15 GRP. DECISION
& NEGOT. 185, 192 (2006) (explaining the concept of concession curves and maxima and minima
in negotiations).
171. Presettlement remediation can be thought of in terms of an investment by firms to
identify the enforcer’s willingness to pay for remediation (whether it is completed pre- or
postsettlement). Professors George Triantis and Albert Choi offer a model along those lines of
sellers’ ex ante investments in contracts (here, a firm’s presettlements remediation) in which best
and worst options are initially unknown to the parties. Albert H. Choi & George Triantis,
Relationship-Specific Investment, Asymmetric Information, and the Role of Knowledge-Based
Obligations in Contracts 7 (Jan. 25, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3330973 [https://perma.cc/W9RF-4EAY].

JENNINGS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT

3/25/2021 8:03 PM

1609

minimum conditions and without knowing the remediation-to-credit
function between them—firms will choose to overshoot if the expected
credit is still greater than the remediation cost.172
Second, in balancing reform uncertainty against finality, enforcers
will compensate for uncertainty by requiring considerable remediation
efforts that both convince themselves of the firm’s recidivism-risk
reduction and support their institutional and individual interests.173 For
example, an enforcement attorney will want to ensure that agency
leaders are satisfied with the risk reduction expected in connection
with remedial efforts.174 These efforts, however, may be more
substantial than is truly necessary, making them inefficient. In some
cases, they may not align to the firm’s reform objectives because what
efforts are needed may be unknown or misidentified in the run-up to a
settlement.175 In the latter case, remediation’s effectiveness is also
compromised.
As a consequence of these effects, a firm must also invest in
advocating to the enforcer, which might include paying defense
attorneys to help persuade the enforcer that its remedial efforts merit
credit.176 This advocacy represents a transaction cost within the larger
settlement process. In addition to advocacy, a firm might purchase
outside advice from compliance experts on what remedial efforts will
advance its advocacy and at what scale they should be undertaken.
Outside advisers would be expected to have an approximate
understanding of what remediation is required for a given amount of
credit, knowledge gained from personal experience in enforcement or

172. See Miller, supra note 49, at 254–55 (offering a model in which a rational, profitmaximizing, and risk-neutral firm “will expend resources up to the point . . . where the marginal
cost of compliance equals the marginal cost of sanctions avoided”).
173. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
174. One former federal prosecutor now working as a white-collar criminal-defense attorney
explained that “[p]rosecutors recognize that . . . it’s a bad outcome and is not flattering to the
Justice Department if companies that settle with the Justice Department get in trouble again.”
Interview with Attorney A (Nov. 6, 2019) (on file with author).
175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
176. See Garrett, Scapegoat, supra note 56, at 1830 (acknowledging fears that defendants
influence enforcers by hiring their former colleagues but suggesting that “these fears . . . may not
have much explanatory power”). One white-collar defense attorney interviewed for this Article
noted that remediation presentations to enforcers are often most effective when delivered by
compliance personnel, rather than attorneys. Interview with Attorney A, supra note 174. The
interviewee explained that compliance experts might be better able to explain the remediation to
enforcers, versus attorneys delivering a “good remediation story.” Id.
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in advising other corporate defendants.177 These professionals can thus
help firms mitigate their overremediation risk. Policies like the DOJ’s
Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs guidance might also
serve this purpose. Expectations around what is suitable remediation,
however, might trend up and up.178 If one-way ratcheting occurs,
advisers can help firms avoid overremediation in discrete cases but not
in the aggregate.
The measurability and knowledge challenges directly implicate
the public interest in deterring violations by means of ex ante
compliance or ex post remediation. The overremediation challenge
also points to a social cost. Firms that expend more resources than
necessary remediating, and seeking credit for doing so, will have fewer
resources to engage in other socially beneficial activities—such as
research, cutting prices, increasing wages, and paying dividends—at no
greater compliance benefit. Although enforcers, and perhaps the
public, will prioritize remediation’s effectiveness over efficiency, the
latter factor is nevertheless worth concern. The next Part provides a
framework for incorporating remediation provisions into enforcement
settlements that can help defendants achieve more effective, efficient
reform outcomes.
II. FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT
This Part explains how the effectiveness, knowledge, and
overremediation challenges posed by the clawback approach can be
addressed with modest modifications to settlement practice. Under an
alternative follow-up approach, as part of settlement negotiations, an
enforcer offers a minimum and maximum penalty credit for
remediation and the parties agree to measurable reform outcomes. The
twist is that the defendant receives credit only for the outcomes it
achieves. After the defendant implements its reform efforts, the parties
assess what the firm has accomplished, and the remediation credit is
awarded accordingly. This approach means that the cost of failed
reform falls on the firm, thereby protecting the public and committing
management to follow through, which it also has incentive to do
efficiently. By prescribing firms’ reform obligations and enforcers’ role

177. See supra note 83 (describing the professional backgrounds of professionals at a leading
compliance-consulting firm).
178. Soltes, supra note 13, at 1003 (warning that the government’s consideration of
expenditure levels in assessing compliance programs would “encourage[] firms to focus on size
and number of initiatives, rather than their effectiveness,” leading to inefficient ratcheting).
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in assessing firms’ performance, it commits enforcers to give more
attention to recidivism prevention while respecting their preferences
for finality and for focusing time and other resources on new cases. For
instance, under this approach, enforcers can police remediation
without engaging in open-ended postsettlement monitoring. Beyond
these direct effects, this approach enables the collection of data that
can be used to improve future remediation efforts and ex ante
compliance.
Consider the following update to the earlier stylized example.179
Assume again that the enforcer handling the off-label-promotion case
assesses that the appropriate penalty is $100 million. Then, after
assessing the quality of the defendant’s ex ante compliance program or
self-reporting and its cooperation during the investigation, the enforcer
gives a $25 million credit for each. It further determines that preventing
future instances of false off-label promotion (or similar illegal sales
practices) would be worth $25 million. It thus sets a potential
remediation credit of $25 million, meaning that the net penalty—what
the company must pay—will range between $50 and $25 million.
Appropriate penalty
Compliance/self-reporting
Cooperation
Potential remediation
Maximum net penalty
Minimum net penalty

$100,000,000
($25,000,000)
($25,000,000)
($0 to 25,000,000)
$50,000,000
$25,000,000

To illustrate this modified approach, the prior timeline is updated
to include the follow-up enforcement stages described in this Part. It
shows the path of the earlier timeline, with the added steps of followup enforcement. A firm’s reform objective is set at the time of
179. The example is stylized because prosecutors are generally not so explicit in how they
price penalties, or even how they weigh various factors in doing so. See GARRETT, supra note 19,
at 149–50 (finding that only 30 of 255 analyzed NPAs or DPAs disclosed how penalties were
calculated). This example also illustrates a secondary benefit of follow-up enforcement. Under
the clawback approach, a firm’s credit for ex ante compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation are
completed at the time of settlement, but they remain at risk via the enforcer’s power to revoke
the settlement agreement. Although that risk is fairly small, a rational calculation of the value of
these mitigating efforts would require applying a revocation-risk discount. As a matter of
promoting enforcement policy, enforcers should avoid implying discounts on the value of
compliance, self-reporting, and cooperation. And as matter of equity, defendant firms should not
be at risk of losing benefits for completed efforts merely because they fail at achieving recidivismprevention obligations unrelated to the prior credited efforts.
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settlement, along with a contingent remediation credit. Then, after
settlement, the firm implements a remediation program, and finally,
the enforcer and firm assess whether the firm achieved its reform
objective.
FIGURE 2: FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT

A. Stage 1: Objective Setting
At the objective-setting stage, follow-up enforcement requires
identifying a measurable reform objective and pricing it. Clarity on
these points makes it possible for the public to pay only for the
recidivism prevention it bargains for, and it allows firms to avoid
pursuing ineffective or inefficient remediation efforts.
Once an investigation nears its end, the enforcer and firm begin
negotiating a settlement. As remediation goes, the firm will tout the
efforts that it believes justify a mitigated penalty.180 Beyond
remediation, it will also point to the steps it has taken to cooperate with
the government’s investigation and avoid violating the law, including
its ex ante compliance program.181 In general, and unlike the stylized
examples in this Article, the parties will negotiate a bottom-line
penalty, rather than negotiating a top-line penalty and then pricing
individual values for each mitigating factor, such as ex ante compliance,
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Of course, the severity of the penalty is not
the firm’s only concern. In some circumstances, it will face criminal indictment or nonfinancial
collateral consequences—such as bars on government contracting or bad-actor provisions under
the securities laws—all of which it will want to avoid, perhaps even more so than financial
penalties. See, e.g., Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 745, 128 Stat. 2130, 2391 (barring corporations convicted of felonies from receiving
federal contracts); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2020) (barring certain bad actors from making exempt
securities offerings under Rule 506 of Regulation D); see also DOJ Manual, supra note 3, § 928.300 (setting out factors for determining whether to criminally charge a business entity).
181. In the case of presentations to the SEC or DOJ, it will point to its satisfaction of factors
in the SEC’s Report of Investigation and Statement, supra note 115, or the DOJ’s EVALUATION
OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 8. In turn, enforcers will point to that
presentation to justify their decision to mitigate penalties. See Interview with Attorney B (Nov.
6, 2019) (on file with author).
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self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation.182 In this light, the
mitigating factors are priced as a bundle. Even then, they may not be
explicitly “priced” at all, but rather they might merely anchor an
enforcer to negotiate at a certain penalty tier, such as a strong package
anchoring the penalty negotiations around $X million versus a $1.5X
million baseline.183 This implicit approach to pricing can facilitate the
settlement process by avoiding negotiations over composite price
points, which could not only slow down negotiations but also create
intradeal anchoring that would undermine the parties’ ability to reach
a satisfactory bottom-line figure.184 For example, although an enforcer
might have an analytical basis for a proposed penalty—like $X per
violation in a case covering numerous violations—it might want to
avoid being too explicit in its analysis. Doing so would make it harder

182. Compare hypothetical settlement language “the Defendant Firm agrees to pay $100
million as an appropriate civil-money penalty, which will be reduced by $15; $20; and $20 million,
respectively, in consideration of its pre-enforcement compliance program, cooperation during the
investigation, and remedial efforts” with hypothetical settlement language “the Defendant Firm
agrees to pay $45 million as an appropriate civil-money penalty, which incorporates $55 million
in mitigation in consideration of its pre-enforcement compliance program, cooperation during the
investigation, and remedial efforts.”
183. A former federal prosecutor and current white-collar defense lawyer interviewed for this
Article explained that the DOJ is more explicit on pricing than the SEC, and the Treasury’s Office
of Foreign Asset Control is more explicit than the DOJ. The interviewee described pricing in
heuristic terms:
For any case . . . the government either wants to kill you or give you something you
could live with, either way you’re not going to be happy. If you haven’t cooperated,
self-reported, remediated, there is not much of an incentive for the government to give
you anything you could live with. It just informs the tenor of the conversation, whether
at negotiations they start off at a billion or something more reasonable. At end of the
day, you’re starting off at 500, you’ll end up somewhere in the middle. If you
cooperated and remediated, then you end up at 400 rather than 500 . . . . It is very hard
to quantify. When you’re negotiating from a position where you’ve cooperated and
remediated, there is a softer landing, a basis for doing that: okay, we’ll give you another
10% or 20% off.
Interview with Attorney B, supra note 181; see also Och-Ziff DPA, supra note 88, at 3–8
(explaining the basis under the organizational sentencing guidelines for the hedge fund’s fine
range at $266 to $532 million but not explicitly pricing the 20 percent discount represented by the
final $213 million penalty).
184. During a question-and-answer session at a conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, then-Assistant Attorney General Brian Benczkowski rejected the notion that a penalty is “a
number taken out of the sky that’s going to be cut in half two or three times just to get to an easy
resolution.” Dylan Tokar, Justice Department Looks To Streamline Penalty Negotiations in
Corporate Cases, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2019, 5:59 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/justicedepartment-looks-to-streamline-penalty-negotiations-in-corporate-cases-11575500347 [https://
perma.cc/NJ6B-F49E]. Instead, he offered, penalties are based on the organizational sentencing
guidelines and an objective evaluation of the case. Id. But cf. Benczkowski Remarks, supra note
87 (acknowledging that, with respect to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement, in the past
“the Department was less transparent about how it reached the results it did”).
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to justify negotiation-based deviations as having a law enforcement,
rather than a transactional, rationale.185 Similarly, if mitigating factors
are explicitly and individually priced, the parties must expend
additional efforts to justify changes that help them arrive at the final
penalty.186 For both enforcers and firms, it is preferable to avoid
barriers to agreement. This implicit pricing, however, does leave the
tradeoffs the parties make in the settlement process less transparent.
Although a lack of transparency might facilitate settlement on the front
end, on the back end it prevents the public from fully accounting for
enforcement costs and thus reduces its ability to monitor enforcers.187
Focusing just on remediation credit, enforcers and firms using the
follow-up approach must agree to the maximum and minimum
remediation credits—that is, the most credit the firm can receive for
remediation and the least it will receive if it achieves a minimal
compliance threshold. Setting these prices explicitly is necessary
because the firm does not receive remediation credit up-front, but
rather only for outcomes.
If remediation credit is based on actual outcomes, then it follows
settlements must include measurable outcomes that firms are to
achieve. Setting measurable reform objectives also helps with setting
explicit prices for achieving them, and vice versa. Recall the example
of the pharmaceutical company. Setting explicit prices for remediation
might be analytically challenging under current practice: What is the
value, say, of implementing new training, compensation practices, and
compliance monitoring if they are to satisfy a heuristic of “reducing the

185. Practice varies among enforcement agencies and individual enforcement attorneys in
how transparent they are with defendants about setting penalties. The Fraud Section of the DOJ’s
Criminal Division, for example, has been more transparent about its penalty decisions than other
enforcers. See Interview with Attorney A, supra note 174.
186. See Francesco Parisi, The Market for Votes: Coasian Bargaining in an Arrovian Setting, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 745, 762 (1998) (observing that bundling commodities—here, mitigation
components in a settlement—reduces transaction costs versus bargaining over discrete
commodities).
187. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 174 (1990) (explaining that a
constituent’s costs to monitor a public actor “will vary for a single issue at a single point in time,
depending on where the observer fits within the political system, her preexisting levels of
information, and how ‘distant’ is the actor or how complicated and obscure is the process that she
is observing”); see also GARRETT, supra note 19, at 274–75 (urging that “[p]rosecutors should also
be far more transparent about how fines are calculated,” among other reforms for improving the
effectiveness and public accountability of corporate prosecutions).
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risk of recidivism”?188 With follow-up enforcement, however, the
question is more concrete: What is the value to the public of a firm of
X size and Y complexity not engaging in certain categories of unlawful
conduct? Or, to flip the question, for a given level of remediation
credit, what sort of corporate behavior would the public expect to see?
Under this follow-up approach, firms are rewarded not for
reducing the risk of recidivism but for not recidivating. Just as
compliance is not binary, however, neither should be remediation-forcredit pricing.189 Whether a firm manages to follow through and
achieve a given level of compliance is contingent on a number of
factors inside and outside management’s control, including its own
motivation, intrafirm conditions, or external developments. The
pharmaceutical company might not achieve perfect compliance in its
sales practices, for example, though it might achieve a level that
justifies some credit. Alternatively, it might continue to commit too
many violations to merit credit. In this light, parties will agree what
levels of compliance earn the minimum credit and the maximum credit,
and between those extremes, what function yields the credit the firm
receives for a given level of compliance.
For example, imagine that the pharmaceutical company can earn
up to $25 million in remediation credit and that each postenforcement
sales violation reduces the credit by $200,000.190 If methods like the
surveys described below were used to estimate how often the firm
engaged in unlawful sales practices, then that award computation
would be straightforward. If there were fifty instances of sales
misconduct over the implementation period, the firm would receive a
total $15 million in remediation credit. It did not achieve full reform of
its sales practices, but it did achieve a level that the public is willing to

188. Compare this question to one asked by the DOJ’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs, supra note 8, at 18: “What specific changes has the company made to reduce the risk
that the same or similar issues will not occur in the future?”
189. See supra note 13.
190. Corporate-integrity agreements (“CIAs”) used by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services offer one model. CIAs impose stipulated penalties, typically $2,500, for each day
a defendant fails to comply with its settlement obligations. See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement
and Conditional Exclusion Release Between the Office of the Inspector General of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services and Insys Therapeutics, Inc., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS.: OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. 46 (June 5, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pressrelease/file/1170126/download [https://perma.cc/PJG6-97JT]; Pfizer CIA, supra note 28, at 51. See
generally Corporate Integrity Agreements, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: OFF.
INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp
[https://perma.cc/2DUT-W5Y7] (explaining typical CIA components and policies).
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compensate it for. Additionally, there are several other reform-related
terms to negotiate.
First, how long should the implementation period last? A firm
might recidivate for as long as it remains in business, a prospectively
indefinite period. Although the uncertainty around recidivism at
settlement is reason not to award up-front credit, given the finality
interests of both enforcers and firms, pragmatically there must be some
end point.191 More, if remedial efforts have effected a given level of
compliance, then after enough time, observers might reasonably
conclude that they will continue to do so as long as there is a steady
state.192 Thus, as part of the settlement process, the parties must
determine how long management has to implement remediation,
including time to course correct, and when the outcome will be
assessed and the overall credit awarded. This timing requires case-bycase judgment on the likely scope and complexity of the firm’s reform
process.193 The SEC’s policy restricting DPAs to a maximum of five
years offers an outer limit.194 Corporate prosecutions by the DOJ are
also instructive.195 In 2,318 instances since 1990 in which some form of
probation was imposed on a defendant, 28 percent of the terms were
for five years, 6.9 percent for four years, 27.5 percent for three years,
18.4 percent for two years, and 15.8 percent for one year.196 Only three

191. Cf. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1969)
(“[A] decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be
changed in the interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the
decree (the elimination of monopoly and restrictive practices) have not been fully achieved.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248
(1968))).
192. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 734 (“Although monitorships are typically 24 to 36
months in duration, they are expected to have an impact that lasts significantly longer.”).
193. There is a deep gap in knowing to what extent remediation efforts work. An interrelated
question is how much time is needed to implement an effective remediation, test its effectiveness,
and have reasonable confidence that newly achieved compliance is durable. This Article
recommends keeping with existing DPA and NPA timing practice as an initial step toward followup enforcement, but experience should show whether a company can be reformed in a few years.
Cf. GARRETT, supra note 19, at 193 (“We do not know if monitors can effectively reform an entire
company in just a few years . . . .”).
194. See SEC Manual, supra note 4, § 6.2.2.
195. Federal law limits probation sentences to a five-year maximum term. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3561(c)(1) (2018).
196. As of November 17, 2020, the Corporate Prosecution Registry includes 2,082 instances of
some form of probation being imposed on a defendant firm. The percentages in the accompanying
text were calculated from those data. See Brandon Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Crime Table
(CSV), CORP. PROSECUTION REGISTRY (last updated Nov. 17, 2020), https://corporate-prosecutionregistry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/corp-crime.csv [https://perma.cc/NG7P-9H5U].
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terms exceeded five years, and all others were in a range between zero
and sixty months.197
Second, the parties must evaluate the appropriateness of periodic
reporting, or the appointment of a compliance consultant or monitor,
in a new light. Because a settlement with follow-up enforcement does
not award remediation credit up-front, the management followthrough concerns that motivate enforcers to require these
postsettlement monitoring mechanisms would not be as great. More,
as the last Part explains, this kind of settlement would likely have
higher salience with shareholders of public companies, adding an extra
pressure point on management’s follow-through.198 Because
management bears the burden to achieve reform objectives, it might
also hire outside resources on its own when they are needed, lessening
concerns around competency. These points suggest that in many cases
when a monitor would be hired, follow-up enforcement might be a
satisfactory substitute, or even a superior option in effectiveness or
efficiency terms.
B. Stage 2: Implementation
In the objective-setting stage, the parties agree to measurable
outcomes. Management must then turn to achieving those outcomes,
recognizing that reforming complex organizations is a challenging
undertaking that likely requires an iterative process.199 These first two
steps are covered in detail by the DOJ’s Evaluation of Corporate
Compliance Programs guidance.200 The third, fourth, and fifth steps go
further:
1. Identify Root Causes. First, management identifies the root
causes of the violations it must prevent going forward. It will have
already accomplished much of this work through its presettlement
internal investigation, including by reviewing records and interviewing

197. Id. The three probation terms over five years were resolved through a DPA and NPAs,
rather than a judicial sentencing. Cf. supra note 195.
198. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also GARRETT, supra note 19, at 276–77
(“Organizational complexity itself enables more complex and damaging crimes. But complex
organizations can also be more challenging to reform . . . .”).
200. See EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 3–4.
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employees.201 The exemplar pharmaceutical company might find, for
instance, that by compensating sales representatives mostly in
commission, it encouraged them to off-label market.202 Or it might find
that sales representatives were not so much motivated to earn higher
commissions as they were not to fall short on sales quotas and thereby
lose their jobs or be bullied by supervisors.203
2. Design and Implement a Remediation Plan. Identifying the root
causes for violations leads to the second step, selecting and
implementing remedial efforts that are reasonably designed and
expected to resolve those causes.204 Often, more than one initiative will
be needed.205 The pharmaceutical company, for example, might
eliminate sales commissions from its compensation plan. But if sales
representatives or their managers still face performance pressure to
retain their jobs, to avoid being bullied, or to be promoted, violations
might persist.206 This example marks the potential tension between
effectiveness and efficiency. Eliminating accountability for sales
performance, for instance, might prevent sales violations, but it might
also lead to shirking by employees, behavior that imposes a different
set of costs on the business.207 Management must pull multiple threads

201. Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global
Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 714 (2020) (describing
early steps in internal investigations of potential criminal conduct).
202. Cf. Earl D. Honeycutt, Jr., Myron Glassman, Michael T. Zugelder & Kiran Karande,
Determinants of Ethical Behavior: A Study of Autosalespeople, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 69, 73 (2001)
(evaluating whether commission-only compensation is a determinant of automobile-salesperson
ethical behavior).
203. Cf. INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES
INVESTIGATION REPORT 5 (2017), https://wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/investor-relations/
presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4NL-K2T7] (finding that many Wells
Fargo employees who engaged in inappropriate sales practices believed “that failing to meet sales
goals could . . . result in termination or career-hindering criticism by their supervisors” and
“associated their behavior with sales pressure, rather than compensation incentives”).
204. See EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 8, at 4 (“Any
well-designed compliance program entails policies and procedures that give both content and
effect to ethical norms and that address and aim to reduce risks identified by the company as part
of its risk assessment process.”).
205. Cf. GARRETT, supra note 19, at 276–77.
206. See INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., supra note 203.
207. Dominique Rouziès, Anne T. Coughlan, Erin Anderson & Dawn Iacobucci,
Determinants of Pay Levels and Structures in Sales Organizations, 73 J. MKTG. 92, 95 (2009)
(“Firms cannot afford not to reward salespeople when they generate results from their customers;
otherwise, salespeople may shirk, behave unethically, sabotage, or quit.”).
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together to optimize between these at-tension goals: creating a
salesforce that is motivated to sell but not in unlawful ways.
3. Develop Assessment Methods. Third, management must
develop reliable methods for measuring whether relevant types of
misconduct are occurring, aligning those methods to the outcomes it is
responsible for achieving.208 These methods often will need to be
proactive. The exemplar pharmaceutical company might set up a
hotline for physicians to report false off-label claims or kickback
offers.209 That step might identify some misconduct, but it would not be
expected that every physician who encounters this conduct will report
it. She might not care to do so, or she might even accept the kickback.210
Instead, affirmative methods such as surveying salespeople about their
own and colleagues’ practices, randomly polling physicians, analyzing
sales data for outlier patterns, or reviewing recordings of sales calls
might identify a greater level of misconduct than could be seen if the
firm relied only on passive monitoring.211 After developing these
methods, the firm must use them periodically to assess whether the
remedial efforts it has implemented are in fact working.
4. Adjust the Remedial Efforts. Fourth, a firm should assume that
its initial remedial efforts will not satisfy its reform objectives.212 The
third step’s testing process is likely to reveal that these efforts are
effective only to a certain level, or that they are ineffective in some
contexts.213 Faced with these results, management must course correct:

208. Interview with Attorney A, supra note 174 (“The more targeted the remediation is to
the actual facts, the better. If you can point to specific remedial acts that likely would have
prevented what went wrong, that is good.”).
209. See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1795–96 (2007) (discussing survey results in which
many respondents witnessed misconduct but did not report it due to fear of retaliation or a belief
that reporting would not lead to corrective action).
210. See, e.g., Physicians and Pharmacy Sales Reps Indicted for Kickback Conspiracy in Which
Doctors Allegedly Received Money in Exchange for Writing Unnecessary Prescriptions of Nuedexta,
U.S. DEP’T JUST.: U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. N.D. OHIO (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/
pr/physicians-and-pharmacy-sales-reps-indicted-kickback-conspiracy-which-doctors-allegedly
[https://perma.cc/EA47-N7ET].
211. See Miller, supra note 49, at 258–59 (explaining that “it is probably cheaper to mandate
an effective compliance program than to police the underlying conduct” because “[u]nlike
primary misconduct, which is usually hidden from view, large parts of the compliance program
are easy to observe”).
212. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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determine the reason behind a deficiency and what additional remedial
efforts, or changes to existing efforts, will address it.
5. Iterate Steps (1) Through (4). As a final step, management
iterates the process. By adopting best practices initially and then testing
their effect on the firm’s compliance levels, management can refine its
efforts until it either achieves the level it promised the enforcer or
comes close to it.
C. Stage 3: Assessment
In the final stage, the parties assess whether the firm has achieved
the level of reform it promised or, if not, how far it has fallen short.
Based on that assessment, the contingent portion of the enforcement
action’s penalty becomes fixed: the firm must pay either the maximum
penalty (receiving no credit),214 no further penalty (receiving maximum
credit), or some amount between those two points. If the enforcer
deferred this portion of the penalty, a firm that does not qualify for the
maximum credit will pay the enforcer the difference, plus an
appropriate amount of interest. If the firm prepaid the full contingent
penalty, the enforcer would issue a refund.215
The prior Section identifies the need for reliable instruments to
test whether violations are happening and whether remedial efforts are
working. Similar methods may be used at the assessment stage. As with
any instrument, assessments of a firm’s compliance should be
adequately valid, accurate, and precise—does the instrument measure
what it is intended to measure, are its measurements unbiased, and are
they nonrandom?216 If the exemplar pharmaceutical firm presented
hotline data related to its sales practices, those data alone would be

214. Although enforcers have the ability to exert pressure through sanctions and incentives,
firms cannot be fully coerced into reforming themselves. The immediate consequence for firms
that fail to meet even the minimum threshold is that they are held fully responsible for past
wrongdoing—namely, they must pay the full contingent penalty. Those instances may, of course,
arise because the firm has recidivated at a level serious enough to face a new enforcement action.
In that case, it will be fully punished for past violations apart from any sanctions it faces in
connection with new violations. But see supra note 25 and accompanying text (expressing
skepticism that those consequences are credible).
215. Charging interest is not necessary to this approach but doing so may promote the reform
process. For example, a settlement might allow for a defendant to accelerate its remediation
assessment if that process took less time than anticipated. It would be motivated to finalize the
case early, and the accrual of interest would add incentive to avoid delay.
216. See DAVID LEBLANC, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE 5–9
(2004).
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valid (they do measure sales-practices violations) but inaccurate (they
are biased by the omission of unreported violations). Although
management is generally best positioned to develop these instruments,
enforcers have a role in questioning their appropriateness. Indeed,
enforcers that routinely use follow-up enforcement in settlements
might do enough Stage Three assessments to justify hiring internal
experts to help line enforcers evaluate the instruments and their
results. At Stage Three, firms and enforcers will ideally cooperate in
making the assessment and will mutually agree on the appropriate level
of credit. In cases of impasse, however, the settlement’s text should
provide for a neutral who can hear each side and resolve
disagreements.217 In any case, firms should disclose their remediation
methods, instruments, and data to the enforcer for use in advancing its
own remediation expertise. More, enforcers should be allowed to
provide these disclosures to scholars or the public for use in advancing
the empirical foundations of compliance,218 subject to reasonable
anonymization.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF FOLLOW-UP ENFORCEMENT
Part I draws attention to problems in the clawback approach to
recidivism prevention. Part II shows how follow-up enforcement can
address these challenges while producing public-good compliance
knowledge. This Part closes with implications of the follow-up
approach for corporate governance, enforcement, and compliance. It
also reviews potential objections by firms and enforcers as well as
conditions that must be satisfied before follow-up enforcement would
be expected to be incorporated in settlements.
A. Corporate Governance
This Article describes a new approach for crediting and promoting
remediation for firms that have broken the law. There is much in it that
management might favor. For example, firms need only implement
remedial efforts that management believes will address the root causes
217. The Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
has long incorporated postsettlement reviews by independent-review organizations (“IROs”)
into CIAs. See supra note 190. Although the IRO model might not be necessary for cases in other
enforcement domains, it is one alternative to the approach proposed in this Article (in which the
parties make the assessment and only then submit disagreements to a neutral).
218. See Stucke, supra note 121, at 792–93 (observing that despite significant scholarly
research on the effectiveness of ethics programs in preventing corporate crime, “[t]he empirical
foundation of effective compliance . . . remains incomplete”).
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of past violations and effect a target level of compliance. They
themselves can choose the most cost-effective means to do so, versus
choosing means that will impress enforcers during settlement
negotiations or accepting recommendations from compliance
consultants or monitors.219 They are given time after settling an
enforcement action to achieve these results, without pressure to
commit to a specific remediation plan during an investigation, when
the root causes are least understood and the effectiveness of remedial
efforts is least certain.220 More, firms would be less likely to experience
the disruption and expense of a consultant or monitor.221 And, if
enforcer behavior appears to be driven by political considerations or
becomes unpredictable between administrations, management might
also favor settlements that minimize the enforcer’s influence or
discretion over the reform process.
Despite these benefits, other effects of follow-up enforcement
might meet with less favor among managers. A chief objection would
be that this approach cuts against finality in closing an enforcement
action. It would leave one piece of the case open, potentially for years,
after the settlement.222 Relatedly, this loss of finality would coincide
with a loss of certainty because the cost of recidivism would be
reallocated from the public to the firm.223 It removes the day-to-day
burden from the enforcer to police the settlement and affirmatively to
initiate clawbacks. In turn, it places the burden on management to
show that remediation credit was earned.

219. See generally supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of these problems.
220. That is not to say that obvious remediation should not be done during an investigation.
Firms should take immediate steps to stop unlawful activity. Employees should be told to stop an
unlawful practice, for example. And an executive known to have directed unlawful acts should be
discharged. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 79 (crediting the presettlement discharge of Johnson
Controls employees who engaged in misconduct, including “high-level executives at the Chinese
subsidiary”). In terms of a plan to manage recidivism risk at the margins, however, firms would
have more flexibility under the follow-up approach.
221. See Benczkowski Memorandum, supra note 80, at 2 (directing that monitors should be
appointed only when necessary and never for “punitive purposes”).
222. See supra Part I.A.1 for a discussion of enforcers’ and defendants’ shared interests in
finality. Of course, it is the case for DPAs and NPAs that the matter remains open, potentially
for years, after settlement. This burden on finality interests thus may be nothing new. The followup approach might still even represent an improvement from a firm’s view if the alternative is a
DPA or NPA that includes the appointment of a monitor.
223. See generally supra Part II (identifying firms’ finality interests and explaining how current
enforcement practice allocates recidivism risk onto the public by giving remediation credit up
front at the time of settlement).
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But what bothers management might nevertheless be positive for
the firm’s governance, especially if it is a public company. Legal
violations, and a corporate culture that enables them, represent an
agency cost.224 Shareholders bear this cost directly in the form of
investigations, penalties, and other sanctions.225 Corporate misconduct
can also coincide with other agency costs.226 In this light, shareholders
might share an enforcer’s concern about management’s motivation to
effect reform, while follow-up enforcement keeps pressure on it to do
so.227
In public companies, follow-up-enforcement obligations would
need to be disclosed to shareholders.228 By publicizing that the firm has
a remediation obligation and a related contingent liability,229 the
reform process is elevated as a matter of corporate governance.230
Directors might monitor the remediation process more closely given its
inclusion in the company’s public disclosures.231 A disclosed contingent

224. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals?
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 5 (1999)
(“[S]hareholders do not typically seem to have benefitted from the encouragement of crime. The
prospect of corporate crime appears to be one of the many agency costs that is limited but not
eliminated through deployment of costly corporate governance mechanisms and the costly efforts
of top management.”); Langevoort, supra note 17, at 939 (noting that managers may enjoy private
payoffs for corporate wrongdoing that ultimately imposes costs on firms).
225. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 224; Stucke, supra note 121, at 777–78 (collecting
literature on the salutary effects of effective compliance on business performance, as well as
compliance’s potential to deter misconduct from the start).
226. See generally, e.g., Simi Kedia, Shuqing Luo & Shivaram Rajgopal, Profiling: Does Past
Compliance Record Predict Financial Reporting Risk? (Jan. 11, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (examining data on corporate product-safety, antitrust, worker-safety,
worker-rights, and environmental violations and finding a statistically significant association
between a record of compliance failures and financial misreporting).
227. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Activism in the Era of Trump: What Strategy Works?,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/21/
shareholder-activism-in-the-era-of-trump-what-strategy-works [https://perma.cc/4YXR-3NH4]
(discussing pressure from Wells Fargo shareholders in the wake of the bank’s accounts scandal).
228. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (disclosure requirements of “material pending
legal proceedings”).
229. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 450-20-50-5 (FIN. ACCT. STANDS. BD.
2020) (“Disclosure is preferable to accrual when a reasonable estimate of loss cannot be made.”).
230. The integrity of management, or management’s competence to effect integrity in others,
is likely to be a significant governance concern for investors. William R. McLucas, Mark B. Lewis
& Alma M. Angotti, Common Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws,
51 BUS. L. 1221, 1229 (1996); see also Armour et al., supra note 50, at 5 (theorizing that managers
prefer not to make compliance-related disclosures because high levels of compliance investments
could be interpreted as indicating high risk for misconduct).
231. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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liability is also likely to be more salient for investors than a closed-out
enforcement action.232
These disclosures could drive more than governance-based
pressure. Prospective counterparties, including potential commercial
partners or acquirers, will look to a company’s disclosures for opensource diligence, perhaps before ever approaching the company about
a deal.233 Knowing that a firm is undergoing active remediation might
give prospective counterparties pause. Recall the exemplar
pharmaceutical company. A startup that has recently received
approval for its first therapeutic might look for a distribution
agreement with a larger player. If it sees that the exemplar company’s
salesforce is undergoing remediation, it might decide it cannot accept
the compliance risks and so choose another distributor. Or it might
insist on terms that compensate for the distributor’s compliance risk.
Given this potential burden on business development, firms will work
to complete remediation quickly. Follow-up enforcement thus has the
potential to reduce agency costs by enabling increased investor
monitoring while forcing commitment by management to follow
through and achieve the target compliance level it and the government
agreed to.234
B. Corporate Enforcement
Follow-up enforcement would allow enforcers to carry out
recidivism prevention more effectively and to transfer much of the
burden and risk for that function to defendant firms.235 Downstream, it

232. This point follows because there is uncertainty around a contingent liability, whereas
there is no uncertainty around a finalized enforcement action. For example, in one study of
market reactions to announcements of accounting-related investigations at public companies,
announcements of informal inquiries and formal investigations resulted in -15.84 percent
and -13.20 percent abnormal returns in share prices, whereas contemporaneous announcements
of both an enforcement action and its settlement resulted in -6.71 percent abnormal returns in
share price. Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking
the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 592 (2008). The authors hypothesize that
the smaller reactions to already-settled announcements were driven by the certainty they
provided or by the fact that they were likely to involve less serious violations. Id.
233. See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory
Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 510 (2020) (explaining that SEC filings are used
not only by shareholders but also by commercial counterparties).
234. Even for private companies, market pressure might emerge. For example, prospective
counterparties’ diligence might uncover settlement agreements, lists of ongoing remediations, or
the results of completed processes. These findings could in turn affect the willingness of
counterparties to deal and on what terms they will agree to.
235. See generally supra Part II (discussing follow-up enforcement).
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would allow enforcers to develop knowledge that would not only make
future enforcement-based remediation more successful but would also
prevent—through advances in compliance practice—subsequent
violations.236 From a reputational perspective, using this approach
would allow enforcers to tout that they are reducing the danger that
the public “overpays” in settlements.
But this approach’s consistency with enforcers’ recidivismprevention and reputational interests is partly offset by other interests.
For individual enforcers, large-scale adoption of follow-up
enforcement would serve to reduce future opportunities in the private
sector.237 That is because, for instance, compliance consultants and
monitors would likely be engaged less frequently, meaning those
lucrative mandates would not be as plentiful for former enforcers.238
From a case-management perspective, individual agents would also
keep cases open longer, waiting out the remediation until the
assessment stage. If an agency has regular turnover, individual agents
would need to do Stage Three work on cases inherited from
predecessors. And enforcers might be reluctant to price remediation
explicitly. But beyond those reasons, explicit pricing allows for greater
public monitoring of enforcers, the actions they take, and the
settlements they reach on behalf of the public: Is the public paying
appropriate amounts for settlements and are settlements leading to
reductions in recidivism? Increased monitoring in turn increases
enforcers’ reputational risk around settlement pricing and outcomes.239
A related caution is that the pricing and remediation transparency
that follow-up enforcement requires should not teach firms how to
avoid detection or game enforcement.240 Enforcers have limited

236. See Garrett, supra note 29, at 903–04 (describing the “prevention stage” of enforcement).
237. See Ford & Hess, supra note 14, at 712 (reporting one interviewee’s view that recently
departed state or federal prosecutors are likely to be selected by their former colleagues for
monitorships); see also Our Trusted Experts, supra note 83 (listing the professional backgrounds
of professionals at a leading compliance-consulting firm).
238. Although firms will still often need outside expertise to support their reform processes,
as follow-up enforcements build new empirical understanding for implementing and testing
remediation, enforcers who gained expertise in those methods might be sought out in the markets
for ex ante compliance and ex post remediation services.
239. See Noah Kupferberg, Note, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 160–62 (2008) (calling for the use of police consent decrees to
collect and publish data to enable greater public monitoring of law enforcement).
240. See Benczkowski Remarks, supra note 87 (“Although many aspects of prosecutors’ work
must be kept confidential, there is no need for there to be a black box around the principles and
policies that guide our decisions.”).
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resources and so they must prioritize what investigations they open and
the actions they bring.241 They remain able to achieve a level of general
deterrence by maintaining some informational asymmetry between
themselves and firms on what their priorities are and how they will
make investigative and charging decisions.242 Too much transparency
might enable firms to make rational calculations to break the law.243
These considerations suggest that line enforcers are unlikely to
structure settlement agreements using this Article’s follow-up
approach, creative settlement practices being inconsistent with their
personal risk and reward incentives. Instead, it would likely be agency
leaders like U.S. attorneys or state attorneys general, who would have
personal incentive structures that are more likely to award creativity,
who lead the way. Even for those entrepreneurial leaders, though, if
this approach is to be used, it is likely to emerge in cases susceptible to
easily defining what recidivist acts lead to reductions in remediation
credit and how they would be calculated. The earliest instances of
follow-up enforcement might be quite rudimentary and only grow in
sophistication with subsequent rounds of experience. Just as settlement
practices have evolved over time, follow-up practices would be
expected to evolve based on new circumstances and learning from
prior settlements. Of course, whether recidivist acts themselves
become subject to enforcement, or whether they are merely used to
calculate remedial credit for past misconduct, is an open question for
enforcers to decide. Presumably, the enforcers’ costs to open and
pursue a new case for modest recidivist violations would outweigh the
social value of doing so, and thus it would rely on adjustments to the
remediation credit as a sanction. Under the current clawback
approach, modest recidivist violations would be unlikely to result in
further enforcement, whereas they would yield consequences under
the follow-up approach. This result would partly fulfill the policy aim
of follow-up enforcement to increase monitoring of and consequences
for corporate recidivism.

241. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
242. This informational asymmetry is reduced, of course, when enforcers announce priorities
or when defense attorneys are former enforcers or repeat players in corporate investigation and
enforcement defense. But see Garrett, supra note 29, at 903 (noting that enforcers announce
enforcement priorities in speeches to white-collar attorneys as part of industry-wide deterrence
efforts).
243. See generally Becker, supra note 15, 176–79 (describing conditions under which an actor
will decide that the expected benefits of breaking the law exceed the expected consequences for
doing so).
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As a final note, because current settlement process is largely a
creature of agency practice rather than an explicit statutory scheme,
entrepreneurial enforcers have flexibility to graft follow-up
enforcement onto their current practices. This Article sketches general
approaches for doing so that can be tailored to a given regulatory
jurisdiction and public-protection mandate. But this flexibility should
be used cautiously. Professors Jennifer Arlen and Richard Epstein
observe that current practice raises due process concerns.244 In keeping
with their observations, and given enforcers’ inherent discretion and
significant leverage over corporate defendants, agencies should
consider how follow-up enforcement fits within their internal due
process policies and adapt those policies as needed.245
C. Corporate Compliance
Businesses spend billions annually on compliance programs.246
The compliance officer has become ubiquitous in firms across the
United States and appears increasingly among senior leadership
rosters.247 While she was SEC chair, Mary Jo White remarked on
compliance’s central role in contemporary firms, noting that
compliance officers are “gatekeepers” who might be personally
charged if they shirk their duty to promote adherence to the law within
the firm.248 Parallel to this explosion in compliance, firms continue to

244. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 206–09 (2016) (discussing
the need for process to limit discretionary prosecutorial authority); Richard Epstein, Deferred
Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 85, at 38 (reviewing deferred prosecution
through the lens of unconstitutional-conditions doctrine).
245. See Arlen, supra note 244, at 206–09.
246. See sources cited supra note 120 (collecting estimates of annual compliance spending).
247. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, MOVING BEYOND THE BASELINE:
LEVERAGING THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION TO GAIN A COMPETITIVE EDGE 12–13 (2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/state-of-compliance-survey/assets/pwc-2015-stateof-compliance-survey-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RT4-G7DM] (reporting survey findings that 26
percent of respondents’ chief compliance officers reported directly to the CEO, 21 percent
reported directly to the board of directors or its audit committee, and 52 percent had a chief
compliance officer separate from the general counsel).
248. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Compliance Outreach
Program for Broker-Dealers (July 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/opening-remarkscompliance-outreach-program-for-broker-dealers.html [https://perma.cc/6L5E-ZGZQ] (“[W]e
must, of course, take enforcement action against compliance professionals if we see significant
misconduct or failures by them. Being a [chief compliance officer] obviously does not provide
immunity from liability, but neither should our enforcement actions be seen by conscientious and
diligent compliance professionals as a threat.”).
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invest in new ways to quantify their operations and manage based on
those analytics.249 Curiously, however, these trends remain parallel:
compliance today has limited empirical foundation.250
The collective action problem discussed earlier partly explains a
lack of empiricism. Firms withhold their compliance data, perhaps to
avoid embarrassment or antitrust scrutiny or to protect trade secrets.251
The consequence of keeping these data siloed and confidential is to
prevent the measuring of compliance practices for effectiveness, or to
test the validity, accuracy, and precision of the measurements and from
those analyses to develop better instruments. Another influence is the
lack of empiricism in enforcers’ assessments of ex ante compliance and
ex post remediation. The overremediation problem that is discussed
above represents a type of Keynesian beauty contest in which firms
pursue remedial efforts not based on their effectiveness but rather by
anticipating whether enforcers believe in their effectiveness.252 They
thus might set up compliance programs with only secondary concern
for effectiveness.253 In this light, current practice might not only mean
the loss of opportunities to advance empiricism, but it might also
contribute to a lack of it.
Enforcers are in the unique position to participate in multiple
remediations that represent unusual compliance challenges, given that
violations were severe enough to warrant enforcement. They also have
leverage through the settlement process to overcome firms’ desire to
keep compliance data to themselves. By collecting and sharing data
from follow-up enforcements—by forcing the creation of public-good

249. M C K INSEY & C O ., A NALYTICS C OMES OF A GE 65–97 (2018), https://
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey%20Analytics/
Our%20Insights/Analytics%20comes%20of%20age/Analytics-comes-of-age.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7HFG-NU4Q] (discussing the rise and role of analytics in business functions like
marketing and sales, operations, human resources, and risk); William Byers, The Risks of
Quantification, H ARV . B US . R EV . (May 18, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/05/the-risks-ofquantification [https://perma.cc/N2MN-DDLK] (reacting to the accelerating trend toward
quantification).
250. See Stucke, supra note 121, at 800–01. See generally Soltes, supra note 13, at 1006–10
(discussing methods to improve compliance measurement).
251. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
252. In a Keynesian beauty contest, actors make decisions based not on what they believe is the
best decision but rather on their predictions of what others will believe is the best decision. See
Robert J. Shiller, The Beauty Contest That’s Shaking Wall St., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/business/economy/on-wall-st-a-keynesian-beauty-contest.html
[https://perma.cc/G82Z-FZTY].
253. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing this behavior).
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knowledge—enforcers can advance not only their own enforcement
missions but corporate compliance and deterrence more broadly.254
CONCLUSION
This Article offers a critical analysis of how enforcement agencies
use corporate settlement agreements to keep firms from reoffending
after they break the law. It calls attention to temporal misalignment
inherent in awarding up-front credit for remedial efforts whose future
outcomes are uncertain. This misalignment can undermine the
prevention of corporate recidivism, and it can cause the public to
overpay for recidivism prevention or lead to overremediation. It also
explains why enforcers’ clawback authority in settlement agreements
lacks the credibility that would be needed to correct for that
misalignment.
To address these challenges, the Article proposes a follow-up
approach to enforcement. Under this framework, an enforcer and firm
first define reform objectives, including explicit pricing for outcomes,
as part of their settlement of an enforcement action. Management then
works to achieve that objective, a process requiring testing,
reassessment, and often adjustment. In the final stage, the parties
assess what level of compliance the firm achieved and determine how
much, if any, of the contingent portion of the settlement’s penalty the
firm must pay. This evidence-based approach not only prevents the
public from paying for recidivism prevention that is not achieved, but
it also produces a public good: data that can be used to advance
compliance practice generally. Following this framework thus promises
to promote both public protection and the empirical foundations for
corporate compliance.

254. Professors Brandon Garrett and Gregory Mitchell propose alternatives for collecting this
public-good data. Examples include encouraging firms with similar compliance profiles to form
information-sharing “compliance cartels” or requiring firms generally to produce compliancevalidation data to the government. See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 29, at 78, 82.

